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Abstract: 
The broad aim of this research is to outline, assess and elaborate on Davidson’s work on 
radical interpretation and its connections to his understanding of values, and particularly on 
his understanding of the nature of ethical judgments and concepts.  
The central idea that I consider is that the principle of charity must play much the same role 
in the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken 
to show that certain general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which 
Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to 
values as well as beliefs.  
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Introduction: 
Donald Davidson has maintained that, despite the manifest difficulties, no satisfactory 
understanding of ethics (or value generally) can fail to accommodate our lively conviction 
that ethical claims are objectively either true or false. Intriguingly, he has also suggested that 
the consideration of radical interpretation can show that this must be so. Davidson’s 
thoughts in this area are set out primarily ‘Problems of Rationality’ (Davidson 2004) which is 
the fourth volume of his collected essays. Many of these papers however have important 
connections to ideas most clearly set out in papers found in other volumes, particularly in 
‘Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation’ (Davidson 2001b). 
Given the influence of Davidson’s philosophy generally there is a perhaps surprising dearth 
of critical work on this aspect of his work. The broad aim of my work is to outline, assess and 
elaborate on Davidson’s work on radical interpretation and its connections to his 
understanding of values, and particularly on his understanding of the nature of ethical 
judgments and concepts.  
In Chapter 1 l introduce Davidson’s work on radical interpretation, setting out the aims of 
the work and detailing the nature and scope of the constraints that emerge from reflection 
on the role of the principle of charity in interpretation. I emphasise two distinct components 
of the principle of charity, which Davidson has discussed under the titles of the principle of 
correspondence and the principle of coherence. I then go on to introduce certain issues that 
arise when we consider in detail the potential implications of Davidson’s account of radical 
interpretation. 
In Chapter 2 I will consider how Davidson’s work on radical interpretation is connected to his 
remarks about the nature of values, and what its implications might be for ethics in 
particular. The central idea is that the principle of charity must play much the same role in 
the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken to 
show that a certain general presumption about the content of propositional attitudes, which 
Davidson thinks follows from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to 
values as well as beliefs. I will argue that there is prima facie plausibility to the idea that the 
role of the principle of charity in the attribution of values to a speaker will be similar to the 
role of the principle of charity in the attribution of beliefs to the speaker. However I will 
suggest there are important limitations to Davidson’s approach as it is set out, particularly 
with regards to certain claims that he wants to make about ethical judgements.  
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In Chapter 3 I develop the idea that in order to grant Davidson’s general presumption we 
must accept that there are a class of ‘basic beliefs’ which must have some true instances 
because their content is determined by what causes them. Furthermore, in order to make 
substantial claims about ethical judgments on the basis of this general presumption, it looks 
as if it needs to be shown that ethical properties are such that they can feature amongst 
basic beliefs. I argue that nothing in Davidson’s account of radical interpretation seems to 
secure this point outright. I then argue that the nature of ethical properties should make us 
wary of this idea more generally. Specifically, my case against Davidson here turns on 
worries about whether ethical properties can be akin to secondary qualities.  
In Chapter 4 I will consider what I regard as a substantial elaboration of Davidson’s general 
approach that can be found in the work of Susan Hurley. Hurley argues more specifically that 
any attribution by an interpreter of desires and preferences to a speaker is inextricable from 
the attribution of some ethical values. I then look at the more specific question of whether 
or not the argument from interpretation that Hurley presents could show that all speakers, 
as Bernard Williams has put it, must share in some more or less determinate form ‘the same 
materials of an ethical life’. I conclude by suggesting that the sort of problems I raise for 
Hurley can be shown to be problems for the approach more generally.   
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Chapter One: Radical Interpretation 
Radical interpretation is first mentioned by Davidson in his 1967 essay ‘Truth and Meaning’. 
The central aim of this work was to show how to provide a compositional theory of meaning 
for a natural language. Davidson’s proposal was to employ a truth-theory, in the sense of a 
finite axiomatic theory characterising a truth predicate for a language in the style made 
famous by Tarski, to do the work of a theory of meaning. Davidson recognised that in order 
for it to be applied to any natural language such a theory must also be an empirical theory, 
which could be confirmed for particular speakers on the basis of their behaviour in an 
environment shared with the interpreter. Davidson’s general strategy was to embed the 
formal structure of a theory of meaning (the structure he found in a Tarskian truth theory) 
within a more general theory of interpretation. Consideration of radical interpretation would 
serve to illustrate how a theory of meaning might pass the requirement of empirical 
verifiability. Davidson found the basic model for such a theory set out in chapter two of 
Quine’s important book ‘Word and Object’ (Quine 1960, 26-79).  
In his 1973 essay ‘Radical Interpretation’ Davidson posed two questions: firstly, what would 
it be sufficient for an interpreter to know in order to understand the speaker of a foreign 
language, and secondly how could an interpreter come to know it? He suggests that ‘a 
theory of truth, constructed more or less along the lines of one of Tarski’s truth definitions, 
would go a long way towards answering the first question’ (Davidson 2001b, 179). His 
account of radical interpretation was to provide his answer to the second question. 
Elaborating on this account became a prominent focus of much of Davidson’s work from this 
point onwards. 
It is this account of radical interpretation that I am primarily interested in. Ernest Lepore and 
Kirk Ludwig have suggested, correctly it seems to me, that the fundamental idea which 
shapes and motivates much of Donald Davidson’s later philosophy is that the stance of the 
radical interpreter is conceptually basic in understanding meaning and psychological 
attitudes (cf. Lepore and Ludwig 2005, 147-151). According to Davidson the content of any 
thought or propositional attitude is to be understood in part in terms of constraints that 
emerge from the consideration of the process of radical interpretation. 
In what follows I will introduce Davidson’s work on radical interpretation, setting out the 
aims of the work and detailing the nature and scope of the constraints that emerge from 
reflection on the role of the principle of charity in interpretation. I will emphasise two 
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distinct components of the principle of charity, which Davidson has discussed under the 
titles of the principle of correspondence and the principle of coherence. I will go on to 
introduce certain issues that arise when we consider in detail the potential implications of 
Davidson’s account of radical interpretation.  
1. The task and the procedure: 
The task of the radical interpreter is to interpret the linguistic behaviour of the speaker 
without reliance on any prior knowledge of the speaker’s beliefs or the meaning of the 
speaker’s utterances, which is to say without having reference to a shared history or any 
knowledge of the speaker’s language or culture. This is what I will refer to hereafter as the 
radical interpretation scenario. I will also talk simply about speakers, interpreters and 
thinkers (just any speaker or an interpreter) rather than natives and linguists or whatever 
else.1 
The radical interpretation scenario presupposes the existence of at least two agents, each 
responding to the same or similar features of a shared environment. To begin with, the 
interpreter has nothing to go on but the behaviour of the speaker in the shared 
environment. As Davidson once put it, while the interpreter cannot ‘directly perceive’ the 
speaker’s propositional attitudes, he can ‘attend to the outward manifestations’ of these 
attitudes, which is to say that he can directly perceive the utterances and general behaviour 
of the speaker in the shared environment (Davidson 2001c, 210). Assuming that the 
interpreter is able to discover what the speaker thinks and means on the basis of this 
evidence – that is, assuming that radical interpretation is possible – Davidson concludes that 
there must be an intelligible relation between the evidence available and the propositional 
attitudes in question.2 
Davidson believed that an interpreter can often recognise (or is justified in assuming) that 
the speaker has certain types of attitudes towards certain objects (where this means entities 
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity only the speakers and interpreters I discuss will tend to be men. 
2 It is important to note that Davidson is not endorsing a crude form of behaviourism. Propositional 
attitudes are not to be understood as being ‘nothing but’ the available evidence. The point is that 
they must be accessible to the interpreter on the basis of ‘nothing but’ the available evidence in the 
radical interpretation scenario. The thought is simply that the postulation of unobserved phenomena 
must ultimately be tied to the observable phenomena (cf. Glock 2003, 268-9). Davidson certainly 
thinks that the interpreter’s theory of interpretation for the speaker’s language will have to be 
suggested by and tested against the observable behaviour of the speaker in the shared environment. 
However, as should become clear, Davidson also thinks that other constraints come into the picture. 
It is important to avoid any suggestion that the radical interpreter simply reads off, or in any strict 
sense ‘derives’, meanings or beliefs from physical evidence. 
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or events) in the shared environment. These objects include the speaker’s utterances. 
Specifically, Davidson emphasised (initially at least3) that the interpreter can pick out when 
the speaker holds true a given utterance. It is important to note that to some extent the 
whole method rests on this assumption. As Bjorn Ramberg has pointed out, the interpreter 
must assume that he is observing a creature who asserts, and that he is reasonably adept at 
telling when those observed are engaging in the particular linguistic activity even when he 
has no clue what is being asserted (Ramberg 1989, 68). If a speaker holds true an utterance, 
this is in part because of what the speaker believes and in part because of what the sentence 
means. In this sense, holding true an utterance is a ‘vector of two forces’, belief and 
meaning. Granting this much, the fundamental problem that the radical interpreter faces is 
that he cannot assign meanings to the speaker’s utterances without knowing what the 
speaker believes, while he cannot identify the speaker’s beliefs without knowing what the 
speaker’s utterances mean. 
The interpreter must then find a way to provide a theory of belief and a theory of meaning 
simultaneously. There is for Davison only one way that this can be achieved. The solution to 
the problem of how an interpreter could simultaneously identify the beliefs of the speaker 
and the meanings of his utterances rests on a general principle that Davidson, following 
Quine, has typically called the principle of charity. The principle of charity, very broadly, 
directs the interpreter to read his own standards of truth and coherence into the pattern of 
sentences held true by the speaker.  Davidson says: ‘From a formal point of view, the 
principle of charity helps solve the problem of the interaction of meaning and belief by 
restraining the degrees of freedom allowed to belief while determining how to interpret 
words’ (Davidson 2001c, 149). 
In fact, charity provides a multifaceted constraint on interpretation. There are various 
constraints that are subsumed under the general title of charity. These constraints are 
regarded as structural constraints on all interpretation. Interpretation is possible only 
because the interpreter is forced to interpret the speaker in accordance with these various 
constraints. These constraints are also meant to tell us something about the nature of 
propositional attitudes more generally. Essentially then, charity is regarded as both a 
constraint on and an enabling presupposition of any propositional attitude whatsoever. 
                                                 
3 In recent attempts to provide a unified theory of mind and action Davidson has in fact altered the 
evidential basis of radical interpretation from holding a sentence true to preferring a sentence true 
(c.f. Davidson 2004, 19-38). 
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The principle of charity has received many formulations in Davidson’s work, and many more 
in the work of his commentators and critics. Increasingly in later works Davidson has felt the 
need to emphasise two distinct components which fall under the broad title of the principle 
of charity. The content of the speaker’s propositional attitudes is in part constrained by 
causal relations that exist between himself, the speaker and the shared environment, and in 
part constrained by holistic connections with other propositional attitudes. Davidson has 
discussed these components of charity under the headings of the principle of 
correspondence and the principle of coherence respectively (cf. Davidson 2001c 211, and 
Davidson 2005, 44-45). In what follows I will consider these two components of the broader 
principle of charity in turn. It is however important to emphasise from the start that while 
the principle of correspondence and the principle of coherence may seem to involve 
different types of constraints on interpretation they are understood to operate in tandem. 
2. The Principle of Correspondence: 
The principle of charity directs the interpreter to read some of his own standards of truth 
and consistency into the pattern of sentences held true by the speaker. The principle of 
correspondence can be taken to emphasise the point that charity, as employed by the 
radical interpreter, must be applied (initially at least) specifically to the speaker’s beliefs 
about his immediate environment – not simply general beliefs, but specific beliefs. That is to 
say that the interpreter must assume that the speaker’s beliefs about his immediate 
environment are largely true. This point plays an essential role in the interpreter’s initial 
solution for the problem of solving for the meanings of the speaker’s utterances and for the 
speaker’s beliefs in the radical interpretation scenario. It is what allows the interpreter to 
bridge the gap between noticing correlations between the speaker’s attitudes, utterances 
and his environment, and assigning meanings to the speaker’s sentences. 
Which sentences a speaker holds true depends on what the speaker thinks the sentences 
mean and what he believes. If the interpreter knew either he would be in a good position to 
assign the other. The basic idea is this: it is only by assuming that what the speaker believes 
is true, in the light of the conditions in which he is in, that the interpreter is able to solve for 
the belief contents, and then assign the corresponding meaning to the utterance. This thus 
represents a methodological constraint on radical interpretation: the interpreter is 
constrained to start by assuming that the speaker’s beliefs about his immediate 
surroundings are by and large true. It is only by restraining the degree of freedom allowed to 
the speaker’s beliefs in this way that the interpreter can proceed.  
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Davidson has often discussed this aspect of the interpretive process in terms of ensuring 
that the interpreter respects the causal connections that link himself, the speaker and the 
shared environment. Here is a fairly crude, but not I think unfairly crude, outline of how this 
is supposed to work. When an interpreter interprets a speaker, he must assume that the 
objects of the speaker’s most basic beliefs (where again this can be any entity or event) are 
what causes them. The only way for the interpreter to determine what those objects are is 
to identify objects common to both, and assume that what the speaker is caused to believe 
is basically similar to what the interpreter himself is caused to believe by the same objects. 
For this process to be effective (for it to lead to interpretation), when an interpreter 
interprets the beliefs of a speaker it is a necessary presumption (often overridden by other 
considerations) that similar causes are followed by similar responses for both the interpreter 
and the speaker. 
There are two distinct assumptions in play here. Firstly, the interpreter is prompted to 
assume that the speaker is responding to the same features of the world as the interpreter 
himself is. Secondly, the interpreter is prompted to assume that the speaker responds to 
these features of the world in more or less the same way as the interpreter himself does. 
Both of these assumptions are essential. Davidson goes as far to say that unless we assume 
that we can identify and share reactions to common stimuli ‘thought and speech would have 
no particular content – that is no content at all. It takes two points of view to give a location 
to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content’ (Davidson 2001c, 214). 
As well as insisting of what I have called a methodological constraint, Davidson has argued 
for what looks like a much stronger claim. Not only is it the case that the interpreter must 
assume that most of the speaker’s beliefs about his surroundings are largely true (this is the 
methodological claim) but it is also the case that most of the speaker’s beliefs about his 
surroundings must in fact be true (this is the stronger claim). This claim seems to be about 
the nature of thought more generally, but Davidson thinks it follows from the consideration 
of radical interpretation. More precisely, the claim is about the nature of perceptual beliefs. 
According to Davidson, that nature of interpretation ‘guarantees that a large number of our 
simplest perceptual beliefs are true, and that the nature of these beliefs is known to others’ 
(Davidson 2001c, 204).  
Davidson’s view is that the content of any thought or utterance is partly determined by a 
history of causal interactions between speakers and the environment. He has remarked that 
is ‘a commonplace of the empirical tradition’ that any speaker will learn his first words and 
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basic sentences (‘Red!’, ‘Mamma!’, ‘Fire!’ etc.) through ‘a conditioning of sounds or verbal 
behaviour to appropriate bits of matter in the public domain’. Crucially though, for Davidson 
this is not just a story about how a speaker learns to use his first and most basic words, but it 
is also ‘an essential part of an adequate account of what words refer to, and what they 
mean’. This is to say that the contents of any speaker’s earliest and most basic sentences 
must be determined by whatever it is in the world that typically causes him to hold them 
true. It is at this point that the fundamental ties between language and the world are 
established, and certain central constraints on meaning are fixed. For Davidson then what 
ensures that a speaker’s view of the world is, in its plainest features, largely correct ‘is that 
the stimuli that cause our most basic verbal responses also determine what those responses 
mean, and the content of the beliefs that accompany them’ (Davidson 2001c, 204). Further, 
Davidson thinks this can be shown by ‘appealing to obvious facts about language learning 
and facts about how we interpret words and languages with which we are unfamiliar’ 
(Davidson 2001c, 43-45).  
Of course, an interpreter may find a speaker who has lots of true beliefs about wolves say, 
but who has never actually encountered a real wolf before. The content of these beliefs 
about wolves has not been determined by direct exposure to wolves, but by the possession 
of other words and concepts, such as those of a mammal or a pack animal, and perhaps 
some exposure to pictures of wolves in books. The point however is that somewhere along 
the line we must come to direct exposures that anchor thought and language to the world. 
Davidson claims that ‘such direct conditionings of words and objects must lie at the basis of 
interpretation: and if this is so, correct interpretation makes a speaker believe a lot of true 
things about what exists’ (Davidson 2005, 45). 
Davidson was well aware that this sort of view faces a number of obstacles. I will briefly set 
out two potential issues. Firstly, there is what Davidson has referred to as the problem of 
error. The problem of error arises due to the fact that even in the most straightforward of 
cases, it is obvious that the same cause (a rabbit scampers by) may engender very different 
beliefs in the speaker and the interpreter ‘and so encourage assent to sentences which 
cannot bear the same interpretation’ (Davidson 2001c, 152). 
Secondly, Davidson seems to accept that claims about the direct conditioning of sentences 
and objects can only apply directly to some sentences. They seem to apply most directly to 
what Quine referred to as occasion sentences. Occasion sentences are sentences that all or 
most speakers assent to (or hold true) in response to some same sensory stimulation in the 
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environment. It would seem however that the interpreter must move from such sentences 
to understand sentences which are not like this – such as sentences about the past or about 
the future, about people or objects that are not present, or which seem to be about more 
abstract properties or concepts. There are two things to be said here. Firstly, it is far from 
straightforward how an interpreter is supposed to arrive at the attribution of such sentences 
from a starting point of occasion sentences. Secondly, we might think that there are reasons 
to acknowledge a fundamental distinction between the epistemological status of occasion 
sentences and other sorts of sentences. Quine for example certainly gave epistemic 
significance to the distinction between occasion sentences and others. 
Davidson was very keen to avoid any such distinction. Despite his references to the 
importance of ‘direct conditioning’ between the world and the content of propositional 
attitudes,4 Davidson, unlike Quine, has repeatedly played down the significance of some 
privileged range of sentences which relate directly to stimuli in the surrounding area.5 But as 
well as raising a point about epistemology, these remarks relate to a basic distinction 
between Davidson’s approach to radical interpretation and Quine’s. While Quine restricted 
charity to the translation of occasion sentences and logical constants, Davidson advocated 
the application of charity ‘across the board’. That is to say that he has instead focussed on 
the way that the radical interpreter must work his way into a whole block of propositional 
attitudes by following a much more general policy of finding the speaker’s thoughts, 
utterances and behaviour to be generally rational and coherent.6 I will say more about how 
the very nature of these propositional attitudes constrains interpretation in a moment. 
Before I move onto this I will quickly address one rather odd but nevertheless persistent 
misconstrual of Davidson’s work. Davidson has argued that consideration of radical 
interpretation can secure a guarantee that most of any interpreter or speaker’s basic 
perceptual beliefs about the world must be correct. Some commentators have accused 
Davidson of claiming far too much here. Certainly, to suppose that a speaker must be right 
about all of his basic perceptual beliefs would be, to borrow a phrase from Ramberg, to 
engage in a strange form of epistemological occultism (Ramberg 1989, 69). But the principle 
                                                 
4 In fact, Davidson’s argument that a large number of our basic perceptual beliefs must be true 
sometimes looks as if it is meant to be justified by his remarks about direct conditioning. 
5 Davidson does say however retain the distinction between ‘sentences whose causes to assent come 
and go with observable circumstances and those a speaker clings to through change’ and remarks 
that this distinction ‘offers the possibility of interpreting the words and sentences beyond the logical’ 
(Davidson 2001c, 149). 
6 Davidson’s change of emphasis does in fact seem to be epistemologically motivated. Cf. Davidson 
and Blackburn. 
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of charity does not and was never intended to rule out the thought that the speaker may 
make mistakes. The point, as with propositional attitudes considered more generally, is that 
the only incentive for attributing an error is contradictions with previously interpreted 
sentences. As interpretation develops, the interpreter may have good reasons to revise 
some of his initial attributions, including attributions of perceptual beliefs, and to maintain 
that some of the speaker’s beliefs and utterances are false or unreasonable. 
The principle of correspondence then can be seen to represent a methodological constraint 
on radical interpretation. The interpreter is constrained to start by assuming that the 
speaker’s beliefs about his immediate surroundings are by and large true. It is also part of a 
bigger claim that most of any speaker’s basic perceptual beliefs must be true. Davidson has 
always emphasised other constraints on the content of sentences, which I will now discuss. 
What a sentence means depends ‘partly on the circumstances that cause it to win some 
degree of conviction’. It also depends ‘partly on the relations, grammatical and logical, that 
the sentence has to other sentences held true with varying degrees of conviction’. 
3. The Principle of Coherence: 
The principle of correspondence emphasises the need to ensure that the interpreter 
respects the causal connections that link himself, the speaker and the shared environment. 
It is taken to show that the interpreter must assume that the speaker’s beliefs about his 
environment are generally true. It is also connected to the further claim that most of any 
speaker’s perceptual beliefs must in fact be true. The principle of coherence emphasises the 
need for the interpreter to endow the speaker with a degree of rational consistency. It 
shows that the interpreter must assume that the speaker’s propositional attitudes in general 
are largely consistent and rational. 
The necessity of the requirement that the interpreter find the speaker to be largely 
rationally coherent is intimately connected to Davidson’s holistic understanding of 
propositional attitudes more generally. Propositional attitudes are only 
identified/individuated in part according to their relations to other propositional attitudes.7 
For the interpreter, this means that the attribution of any belief, say, to a speaker requires 
the attribution of many related beliefs. This general holistic point is straightforward enough. 
Suppose the interpreter attributes to the speaker the belief that ‘there is a black snake in 
the grass’. The interpreter must assume that the speaker has an idea of what a snake is. 
                                                 
7 Cf. Davidson 2001b, 168: ‘a belief is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this pattern 
that determines the subject matter of the belief, what the belief is about’. 
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They must assume that the speaker believes such things as: a snake is an animal, it has no 
feet, this particular snake is black and not green, it is in the grass and not somewhere else, 
and so on. The principle of coherence shows how the interpreter is constrained to attribute 
a considerable number of beliefs with related content to the speaker if he is to attribute any 
at all. 
Davidson has used considerations of coherence to support the claim that most of the beliefs 
a speaker holds true must be true, at least in the opinion of the interpreter. This is not 
simply a version of the claim that was sketched in the previous section – that was the claim 
that most of the speaker’s basic perceptual beliefs must be assumed true by the interpreter. 
This point is meant to apply to the beliefs of the speaker more generally. Davidson has often 
made this claim by highlighting the limits of any incoherence that can intelligibly be 
attributed to a speaker. Suppose that the interpreter found that many of the speaker’s 
beliefs about what he (the interpreter) called snakes were false. (There is evidence that the 
speaker thinks that snakes have feet). In such a case, it would be hard to see in what sense 
the interpreter could hold that the initial attribution of the belief that there was a black 
snake in the grass could be correctly described as being about a snake at all. Thus the belief 
that there is a black snake in the grass, whether true or false, depends on ‘a background of 
true beliefs, true beliefs about the nature of snakes, of animals, of physical objects in the 
world’ (Davidson 2004, 16). The interpreter could not attribute a true belief that there was a 
snake in the grass, while at the same time attributing wholly false beliefs about snakes. This 
can be generalised to the claim that the interpreter could not attribute any belief to a 
speaker without attributing lots of other true beliefs (true in the interpreter’s opinion) with 
related content. 
There are a number of important caveats to these general claims about the holistic nature of 
propositional attitudes. The failure to appreciate these points has resulted in a significant 
amount of misunderstanding. Firstly, Davidson does not endorse what might be called ‘rigid 
holism’. By rigid holism I have in mind the view that for a speaker to be regarded as having 
any thought with a particular content, there must be some precise list of other thoughts 
with particular contents that the speaker also has to have. Davidson has in fact always been 
very careful to deny that there must be a precise list of things that a speaker must believe in 
order for them to believe for example, that there is a black snake in the grass. Any list of 
connected beliefs would no doubt be very large, but its makeup would be indefinite. The 
point applies quite generally. The interpreter would be unable to attribute the belief that 
there is a black snake in the grass to a speaker without also attributing many of the other 
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beliefs I mentioned above (that a snake is an animal etc.). But, crucially, most of these 
associated beliefs taken individually could turn out to be held false by the speaker, or not 
held at all. Plausibly, a speaker could have lots of true beliefs about black snakes without 
actually having the conceptual resources to differentiate between green and black. 
Some connections among beliefs are more significant than others. Davidson illustrates this 
with the following example: my belief that it is raining today probably contributes essentially 
nothing to the content of my other beliefs about rain except those that are logically related, 
while my belief that rain is caused by the condensation of drops in water-saturated air 
contributes a great deal (cf. Davidson 2004, 15). But this is not to say that the interpreter 
must assume that the speaker is aware of all of the logical consequents of any given belief. It 
is possible for a person to believe something and fail to believe a logical consequence. 
Evidence might even conceivably push the interpreter to attribute a direct contradiction to 
the speaker.8  
Neither, it should go without saying, does Davidson endorse what Lepore and Ludwig have 
called ‘extreme holism’. Extreme holism is the view that a speaker can have any particular 
attitude content if and only if he has exactly all the other related attitudes he in fact has, so 
that any change in the content of one attitude would entail a change in the contents of 
every other attitude. Again, Davidson’s expressed views in fact very clearly reject any such 
suggestion.9 He has in various places stressed that while a change in one belief may 
necessitate changes in others (beliefs that are recognised as being directly tied by logic to 
the altered belief may well change) in general these changes would leave most of our overall 
belief structure untouched.  
There is an important point about interpretation here. The prudent interpreter must ‘strive 
to conserve as much of the existing beliefs as he could when adjusting for new evidence’ 
(Davidson 2004, 14). There is also an important point about Davidson’s holistic 
understanding of the mind more generally. Holism should not be thought to entail that 
everything a speaker believes is in a constant flux due to the input of new information or the 
                                                 
8 Davidson could be criticised on the grounds that, having given up the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
he has no way of distinguishing between the relations which define a state of mind (or the meaning of 
the utterance) and those that are ‘merely’ contingent, and so do not touch content. Davidson has 
remarked that ‘it is well to remember that giving up the idea of a firm line between the analytic and 
the synthetic does not mean giving up the idea of a continuum in which some connections among 
thoughts are far more important to characterising a state of mind than are others’ (Davidson 2004, 
15). 
9 For an example of Davidson’s explicit denials here, see Davison 2004, 11-18. Lepore and Ludwig 
make this point at Lepore and Ludwig 2005, 211-3. 
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as a result of recent reflections. Davidson acknowledges that much may change from 
moment to moment, but maintains that ‘serious changes in our world outlook, ambitions, 
and tastes are for the most part glacially slow’. So while any given change in a belief may call 
for change in some other beliefs, it may have very little influence on any others, and 
particularly on what matters most to a speaker. Should I change my mind about whether a 
friend of mine is wearing a scarf (she seemed to be, but now I see that it is just an extension 
of her dress) this will not alter any of my most basic beliefs about my friend or about scarfs, 
never mind anything else. As Davidson has put it: ‘The importance of holism rests only in 
small part on its flow. Its real importance rests on the fact that the content of any given 
attitude depends on its place in the whole network’ (Davidson 2004, 15). 
Davidson distinguishes between two types of holistic constraints that restrict the 
interpreter’s attempts to individuate the propositional attitudes of the speaker. The first 
Davidson has called ‘intra attitudinal holism’ (Davidson 2004, 13). This category concerns the 
relations among beliefs within the category of belief for example, or desires within the 
category of desires. The basic norms of intra-attitudinal holism are those formulated in 
classical predicate logic or first order logic. One of the ways by which beliefs are individuated 
is by their relations to certain other beliefs (beliefs with related content). When these 
relations are limited to obvious logical relations, it is fairly clear what Davidson has in mind. 
The idea is that the interpreter must look for the best ways to ‘fit’ his own standards of logic 
onto the utterances and beliefs of the speaker. An example may be useful here. Suppose 
that the interpreter identifies a connective that creates a sentence out of two sentences, 
such that the interpreter always (or perhaps almost always) assents to the compound 
sentence when and only when he assents to each sentence alone. In this case, the 
interpreter can do no better than to treat that connective as the sign for a conjunction in the 
speaker’s language.  
The interpreter then must read the logical structures of ‘first order quantification theory 
(plus identity)’ into the language of the speaker. Further, this will not mean simply taking the 
logical constants one by one, but ‘treating this much logic as a grid to be fitted on to the 
language in one fell swoop’ (Davidson 2001a, 136). Davidson says: ‘The point is that by 
interpreting by the only standards of interpretation available to me, I have, on a primitive 
level, made the speaker I am interpreting a good logician (by my own norms of reasoning, it 
should go without saying; I have no others)…With respect to the simplest and plainest logical 
matters, a sharing of norms of rationality is an inescapable artefact of interpretation’ 
(Davidson 2004, 49-50). 
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This feature of Davidson’s account of interpretation follows directly from the requirement 
that interpreter understand the thoughts and utterances of the speaker in accordance with 
something like a Taski-style truth theory. This leads to various formal constraints on the 
interpretation of the speaker. It is a necessary constraint on any interpretation that the 
interpreter find, for example, a recursive structure in the speaker’s language10. The exact 
nature of such constraints is more difficult to make out. We can easily imagine that a 
speaker’s language could be more impoverished in terms of both semantics and syntax than 
the interpreter’s own. Davidson in fact suggests at one point that we could imagine a 
language entirely without imperative or interrogative moods (cf. Davidson 2004, 54). In such 
cases, should the interpreter simply read his own sophisticated semantics and syntax into 
the utterances of the speaker (that is, treat it ‘as a grid to be fitted onto the language in one 
fell swoop’) this could lead to gross distortions. Certainly however Davidson regards it as a 
fundamental constraint on interpretation that the interpreter must find the norms of 
elementary logic have application in the beliefs of those he is interpreting. 
The second form of holistic constraint on interpretation Davidson has called ‘inter-attitudinal 
holism’. This category concerns the relations between the different types of propositional 
attitudes, between for example beliefs and desires, or between beliefs, desires and 
intentions. While attention to intra-attitudinal holism might be thought to emphasise the 
idea that attributing any belief to a speaker will also require the attribution of a cluster of 
other beliefs with related contents, attention to inter-attitudinal holism emphasises that, for 
example, attributing any desire to a speaker will also require the attribution of various 
beliefs and intentions with related contents. This emphasis on inter-attitudinal holism plays 
a crucial role in the development of the idea that not only must the interpreter find the 
speaker’s basic perceptual beliefs to be largely true, but that the interpreter must find the 
speaker to be rational and intelligible overall. It also what enables Davidson to articulate his 
view that, to a large extent, the propositional attitudes come as a set. 
The general idea can be brought out by considering certain relations amongst the various 
evaluative attitudes, and belief and action. Few I think would deny that the interpreter must 
understand the speaker as having certain evaluative attitudes; wants, desires, preferences 
etc. Furthermore, it seems highly plausible that the interpreter must assume that these 
evaluative attitudes will interact with the speakers other evaluative attitudes and with the 
                                                 
10 For Davidson’s arguments that this is a necessary condition of any learnable language, see Davidson 
2001b, particularly essays 1 and 2. 
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speaker’s beliefs and actions in a fairly structured way – otherwise they would not be wants, 
desires, preferences etc. An interpreter would struggle, for example, to understand a 
speaker who sincerely claimed to prefer A to B, but who whenever faced with a free choice 
between A and B consistently chose B.11 This is in part because preferences are understood 
to relate to actions in a certain way. 
It is important to notice the full scope of this constraint when it comes to radical 
interpretation. The propositional attitudes are intimately connected, and come as a set.12 
Most (if not all) of a speaker’s desires will depend on his beliefs. The interpreter could not 
attribute the desire to eat the contents of the dish to the speaker without attributing a 
variety of beliefs about food generally and the particular food in question. The point can also 
be applied to propositional attitudes generally. There are many other kinds of attitudes, 
such as hope, intention, despair, expectation etc. which depend on beliefs to give their 
content substance. Davidson says: ‘Many of the attitudes, like being pleased, proud, or angry 
that something has happened, depend on the true belief that it has occurred. We cannot be 
worried lest something will befall us unless we think it may, or hopeful that we will win a 
prize unless we know, or at least believe, we may’ (Davidson 2004, 16).  
The most basic norms of inter-attitudinal holism are closely linked in Davidson’s work to 
subjective decision theory, as developed by Frank Ramsey and Richard Jeffery among others 
(Davidson 2004, p151-166) and to his understanding of rationality more generally. Ramsey 
and Jeffery both invoke structural rationality constraints built into the very notions of 
preference and degrees of belief. Davidson has sketched how such constraints can be 
employed in radical interpretation13. Piers Rawling highlights two parallels between the 
projects which make the link attractive. ‘Firstly, degrees of belief necessarily fit a rational 
                                                 
11 Assuming of course that there is no further preference C which dictates the choice between A and 
B. 
12 Davidson says: ‘The propositional attitudes provide an interesting criterion of rationality because 
they come only as a matched set. It may sound trivial to say that a rich pattern of beliefs, desires and 
intentions suffices for rationality; and it may seem far too stringent to make this a necessary 
condition. But in fact the stringency lies in the nature of the propositional attitude, since to have one 
is to have a full compliment. One belief demands many beliefs, and beliefs demand other basic 
attitudes such as intentions, desires…This does not mean that there are not borderline cases. 
Nevertheless, the intrinsically holistic character of propositional attitudes makes the distinction 
between having any and having none dramatic’ (Davidson 2001b, 96). 
13 In more recent attempts to integrate the theory of meaning into a unified theory of mind and 
action, Davidson has in fact altered the evidential basis of radical interpretation from holding a 
sentence true to preferring a sentence true (c.f. Davidson 2004, 19-38). Davidson insists that the 
unified theory includes rather than replaces the old project of radical interpretation. But he has 
increasingly stressed that a theory of interpretation and decision theory must be combined (cf. Glock 
2003, 177). 
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pattern. The interpreter need not insist on perfect coherence in order for a speaker to 
qualify as having degrees of belief, but massive incoherence would indicate that he was 
tracking the wrong feature. Secondly, this rational pattern ensures that degrees of belief are 
accessible from without: we can determine them from observable behaviour, which is of 
course the raw data of radical interpretation’ (Rawling, in Ludwig ed. 2003a, 87).14 
Taken together, these holistic considerations regarding propositional attitudes are supposed 
to show that it will be a necessary condition of any interpretation that the interpreter finds a 
considerable degree of rational consistency in the speaker’s utterances and beliefs. 
Attributions of propositional attitudes must be consistent with each other and with an 
overall theory of behaviour. There are limits as to how much logical inconsistency or 
irrationality an interpreter can intelligibly ascribe to a speaker. The rationality constraint 
forces the interpreter to endow the speaker with a whole range of propositional attitudes 
when making sense of their utterances and behaviour. Davidson has summed up this point 
by remarking that if an interpreter cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other 
behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs and attitudes largely consistent and true 
by his own standards, he will ‘have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having 
beliefs, or as saying anything’ (Davidson 2001b, 137). Charity, on Davidson’s account, does 
then not simply constrain the interpreter to find the speaker correct with regards to his basic 
perceptual beliefs and with regards to logical constants – charity is applied across the board, 
which means that the interpreter must read his standards of truth and coherence into the 
propositional attitudes of the speaker quite generally.   
4. The Right Sort of Agreement: 
The principle of charity is taken to show how the propositional attitudes that the interpreter 
attributes to the speaker are constrained in part by an assumption of causal relatedness 
between those propositional attitudes and the objects of those attitudes, and in part by an 
assumption of rational coherence amongst the speaker’s propositional attitudes. These 
constraints make the propositional attitudes of the speaker the propositional attitudes they 
are. In his early formulations of the principle of charity, Davidson emphasises the idea that 
the principle requires the interpreter to ‘maximise agreement’ with the speaker, with 
regards to both truth and overall coherence.  However, Davidson has openly acknowledged 
that this way of putting things can be problematic. He has said: ‘I apply the Principle of 
                                                 
14 I will say more about the connection between radical interpretation and decision theory, and look in 
detail at what might be involved in attributing desires and preferences at all in Chapter 4. 
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Charity across the board. So applied, it counsels quite generally to prefer theories of 
interpretation that minimise disagreement. So I tended to put things in earlier essays, 
wanting to stress the inevitability of the appeal to charity. But minimising disagreement, or 
maximising agreement, is a confused ideal’ (Davidson 2001b, xix). 
It is a confused ideal for two fairly straightforward reasons. Firstly, as the number of 
sentences in any natural language that a speaker might utter is infinite, there is in one sense 
no real way in which there can be a maximum of agreed sentences (cf. Davidson 2001b, xix). 
It certainly makes little sense to speak of counting thoughts or propositional attitudes due to 
our ability to combine a limited repertoire of concepts in a potentially infinite number of 
ways. Consider the following example. Suppose I can have at least one belief, say that my 
chair rotates, and also that I have the concept of a negation. Then it seems that I already 
have an infinity of possible (though of course massively trivial) beliefs: my chair rotates, it is 
not the case that my chair does not rotate, etc. Other connectives, such as conjunction and 
alteration, will ‘add to the infinities; the possibility of predicating redness or solidity to any 
of an endless number of items swells the list, and so on’ (Davidson 2004, 12). 
Secondly, there are good reasons to suppose that a high number of false beliefs which 
accompany the attribution of a particular belief need not necessarily put a strain on that 
attribution. Once the interpreter ascribes to the speaker a belief in a certain superstition, say 
about the luck bringing qualities of severed rabbit feet, it makes sense to ascribe a whole 
raft of false beliefs (false in the interpreter’s opinion) about severed rabbit feet to the 
speaker – that a severed rabbit foot will provide luck in situation X, in situation X1, in 
situation X101 etc. There are of course limits as to how much logical inconsistency an 
interpreter can ascribe to a speaker while at the same time making them intelligible. This is a 
substantial point, and one that is I think well illustrated by consideration of the constraints 
on interpretation set out above. But I take the above remarks to suggest that the idea that 
the principle of charity recommends that the interpreter must strive to ‘maximise 
agreement’ between himself and the speaker on matters of truth and overall coherence is 
not as clear as it might initially have seemed.  
There is a further, and I think more significant issue that emerges when Davidson talks about 
the agreement between the interpreter and the speaker that is required for successful 
interpretation. As David Lewis has famously argued (Lewis 1974), it would be wrong to 
ascribe a speaker with beliefs that the interpreter takes to be correct even in cases where 
there is no plausible explanation of how the speaker could have acquired the beliefs. This is 
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not the obvious point that the interpreter can attribute false beliefs to the speaker (false in 
the interpreter’s opinion) about rabbit feet or whatever. Certainly, Davidson has always 
acknowledged that once the interpreter’s theory of the speaker’s language begins to take 
shape, it makes sense to accept intelligible error and to make allowances for the relative 
likelihood of various kinds of mistake (cf. Davidson 2001b, 196). The point is that, for 
example, the interpreter should not start by ascribing to a speaker beliefs about quantum 
physics or the rules of cricket unless it is plausible that the speaker could have such beliefs. 
When an interpreter applies the principle of charity across the board, he must avoid 
attributing unintelligible insights to the speaker as well as attributing unintelligible error. 
That is to say that the interpreter must maximise agreement of a certain sort. 
What Lewis says here is seems to be highly plausible. It would also be very uncharitable to 
assume that Davidson would have disagreed (in fact he didn’t). But perhaps the fact that 
Lewis felt the need to make the point in a response to Davidson shows that some of 
Davidson’s formulisations of his position are not as clear as they might be. Davidson is 
essentially saying that there are limits to how much inconsistency (and falsehood) an 
interpreter can ascribe to a speaker. Or, to put this another way, what a speaker believes 
must be consistent and true for the most part, by the lights of the interpreter. Perhaps we 
might think that the talk of ‘maximising agreement’ is simply an infelicitous way of making 
this point.  
However I think that there is more to this issue than this. Davidson continued to suggest that 
an interpreter must ‘optimise’ agreement between himself and the speaker, that the 
interpreter should make the speaker right when plausibly possible. He did so while at the 
same time recognising that it is difficult to say what exactly the right sort of agreement is. In 
one place he remarks that his point has always been ‘that understanding can be secured 
only by interpreting in a way that makes for the right sort of agreement. The ‘right sort’, 
however, is no easier to specify than to say what constitutes a good reason for holding a 
particular belief’ (Davidson 2001b, xvii). In fact, Davidson often suggests that charity urges 
the interpreter to maximise agreement on ‘basic’ or ‘structurally important’ propositional 
attitudes. But this simply defers the problem, leaving him with the task of specifying the 
‘basic’ or ‘structurally important’ propositional attitudes on which we must maximise 
agreement. In any case, without some clear specification of the ‘right sort of agreement’, 
our understanding of the principle of charity seems to be incomplete.  
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There are two reasons why I think we should regard this is a problem. The first is that, if this 
is so, then any vagueness on this point might be expected to spread to whatever 
implications we want to draw from the consideration of the principle of charity. The 
principle of charity is deeply implicated in Davidson’s arguments against the possibility of 
our being fundamentally mistaken about how things are (that is, his epistemological claims) 
and his arguments against conceptual relativism (that is, his rejection of the possibility of 
radically alternative conceptual schemes). When a key premise of these arguments is 
formulated in terms of a rough and unspecified notion of ‘maximising the right sort of 
agreement’ this is likely to result in suspicion, and justifiably so. 
The second is that there seem to be a variety of different kinds of agreement and 
disagreement that can exist between speakers. As Bernard Williams has emphasised, there 
is no reason why an interpreter should not find that a great deal of disagreement exists 
between himself and the speaker, or that this should be alarming or even surprising at all. 
What seems to be important is that in different contexts disagreement will require different 
sorts of explanation, as will agreement. Williams says: ‘The way we understand a given kind 
of disagreement and explain it has important practical effects. It can modify our outlook or 
our attitudes to others. In relation to other people, we need a view of what is to be opposed, 
and in what spirit. In relation to ourselves, disagreement can raise awareness that we can be 
wrong’ (Williams 1985, 132-3). 
Indeed, Williams has occasionally drawn attention to what strikes me as an extremely 
important form of ethical disagreement - namely the sort of disagreement that can occur 
between those who do use a certain ethical concept and those who don’t. Whether the 
consideration of radical interpretation can tell us anything about how an interpreter could 
hope to maximise the ‘right sort of agreement’ in this context is yet to be shown. Given 
Davidson’s claims about ethical objectivity this is a significant issue. What we can say about 
this type of disagreement is important because, as Williams has pointed out, one of the 
things that people want when they talk about objectivity in ethics is this: ‘They want there to 
be one canonical, homogeneous ethical language. They want it to be conceptually 
homogeneous across cultures, and across disagreements within our culture’ (Williams 
1995a, 240).  
5. Necessary and Contingent Constraints: 
There is another general issue with Davidson’s work on radical interpretation which I wish to 
raise at this stage. In response in part to the sort of consideration raised by Lewis, some of 
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those interested in the radical interpretation method (that is to say, some of those 
interested in how the consideration of radical interpretation might yield insights into the 
nature of belief, meaning and understanding more generally) have attempted to modify or 
refine the principle of charity from its earlier formulations. As Glock has remarked, the 
majority of these modifications are based around the thought that the interpreter should 
ascribe to the speaker beliefs that it is psychologically or anthropologically plausible for 
them to have, whether or not these beliefs coincide with the interpreter’s own (cf. Glock 
2003, 185-6). Such modifications have often been signalled by redrawing the principle of 
charity as the ‘principle of humanity’.15 Other advocates of the radical interpretation method 
have dismissed these modifications out of hand as distortions of Davidson’s original project, 
and tended to deride the psychological or anthropological assumptions invoked as ‘labour 
saving heuristic aides’ which may guide actual interpretation but are irrelevant to the 
process of radical interpretation (cf. Ramberg 1989, 64). This issue marks an important 
divide in the literature on radical interpretation that is often overlooked. 
While Davidson was always mindful to emphasise the distinction between the question of 
how an interpreter would actually go about understanding a speaker and the question of 
what would be necessary and sufficient for such understanding (cf. Davidson 2005a, 111) I 
am of the opinion that the precise connections between these questions are somewhat 
ambiguous. There is certainly some evidence that Davidson was open to the sort of concerns 
that have been expressed by advocates of the principle of humanity. As early as his 1973 
essay ‘Radical Interpretation’ Davidson was emphasising that charity was subject to 
‘considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of social conditioning, and of course 
our common-sense, or scientific, knowledge of explicable error’ (Davidson 2001b 196). Also, 
in his reply to Lewis and Quine, Davidson appears to endorse something like the principle of 
humanity: ‘The improved principle of charity (Lewis’s, that is), insofar as it says there are 
cases where you can make exceptions right from the beginning, is what I espouse…We 
imagine that the speaker does what he did and I do what I do, and we construct his resulting 
beliefs, not by making his beliefs like mine, but rather by imagining what I would have 
believed if I had done what he did and been where he was‘ (Davidson 2001b, 282). Davidson 
here is acknowledging that the radical interpreter will be making assumptions about the 
psychology of the speaker, though he does go on to add the potentially important caveat 
                                                 
15 According to Steven Lukes, for example, the principle of charity counsels ‘Count them right in most 
matters’ while the principle of humanity counsels ‘Count them intelligible or perhaps count them 
right unless we can’t explain their being right or can better explain their being wrong’ (Lukes 1982, 
262). 
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that ‘as a roughly stated principle I feel that there is a lot to this; as a sharp principle I’m not 
sure that it doesn’t assume too much about what must be going on, or should be going on in 
the speaker’s head’. 
How far these remarks represent a move away from Davidson’s original construal of the 
principle of charity is an intriguing question that I do not take up here. I am more interested 
in the following question: What, if any, psychological or anthropological assumptions are 
required in order for a radical interpreter to be able to interpret a speaker? That is, what, on 
Davidson’s account (the account that I have set out, the account that emerges from his later 
papers), must the interpreter assume about what is or should be going on in the speaker’s 
head? In order to consider this issue I will borrow a distinction introduced by Simon 
Blackburn in his book ‘Spreading the Word’ (Blackburn 1984, 277). Here Blackburn 
distinguishes between a ‘homely’ radical interpreter and a ‘bleak’ radical interpreter.16 
According to Blackburn, a ‘homely’ interpreter will set out to interpret the speaker in such a 
way as to make him generally rational and intelligible. This will involve the interpreter seeing 
the speaker as having certain intelligible aims, and performing certain actions as means of 
furthering those aims. The general constraint to find the speaker intelligible ‘may include 
quite specific constraints on how to interpret them – for instance, if they appear to have 
their attention focussed on one place or thing, whose changes are exciting them, not to 
regard them as talking about things they cannot see’ (Blackburn 1984, 277). The homely 
interpreter, by exercising the principle of humanity, enters not only into the likely beliefs of 
the speaker, but also into the likely desires, needs and wants of the speaker. He also seems 
to make assumptions about what the speaker finds salient in his environment. To a 
significant extent then the homely interpreter seems to enter straight into the psychology of 
the speaker, making a variety of psychological and anthropological assumptions from the 
start. 
The ‘bleak’ interpreter, by contrast, ‘dislikes armchair psychologising’. The bleak interpreter 
attributes meanings to the speaker’s utterances on the basis of a ‘bare description of what is 
said, and of what purely natural, non-psychological features of the speaker’s situation 
surrounded the saying of it’ (Blackburn 1984, 278). The bleak interpreter can look to the 
natural (where this seems to mean physical or causal) relations that speakers have to things 
in the environment. But his evidence is presented in non-psychological terms for the bleak 
                                                 
16 For my purposes here I can avoid the implication that the ‘homely’ or ‘bleak’ interpreters might 
represent the approaches of any actual philosophers.  
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interpreter will use this evidence in his attempt ‘to construct a scientific semantics of the 
speaker’s language’.17 The bleak interpreter is constrained by a general policy of charity. 
That is he is constrained to assume that the speaker’s utterances are true as far as possible. 
But any attempt to cash this out in terms of assumptions about the general psychology or 
anthropology of the speaker are out of keeping with the procedure of the bleak interpreter.  
Now regardless of what we might think about the bleak interpreter, about his project or his 
prospects, the key point is that his approach does not seem to be completely in line with the 
approach to radical interpretation that Davidson sets out in his later work. This is suggested 
by the distinction between Davidson’s work on radical interpretation and Quine’s work on 
radical translation which was introduced earlier. Where Quine restricted the application of 
the principle of charity to the translation of logical constants and occasion sentences, 
Davidson has advocated the application of the application of the principle of charity across 
the board. What does he mean by this? Firstly, as was mentioned above, Davidson has 
increasingly played down the significance of some privileged range of sentences which relate 
directly to stimuli in the surrounding area. Secondly, as was also mentioned above, Davidson 
claims that the interpreter must find the speaker to be largely similar to himself, and that 
this similarity involves not just beliefs but also desires, intentions and other propositional 
attitudes (remember the remarks about the interpreter working his way into a whole block 
of propositional attitudes). Finding the speaker to be rational and intelligible seems to 
involve attributing a range of propositional attitudes (cf. note 11 above). The point I take it, 
is that if the speaker has any propositional attitudes, they have many.  
It appears then that it is fair to say that the radical interpreter, on Davidson’s account, must 
to some extent enter into the psychology of the speaker. If the radical interpreter can 
understand the speaker at all, he has to understand his utterances and actions in terms of a 
whole range of propositional attitudes – beliefs, wants, needs, preferences, desires etc. 
Perhaps I can put the point like this: the attribution of general rationality necessarily involves 
a variety of what look like, on any description, psychological assumptions about the speaker. 
This is not to say however that Davidson’s radical interpreter should be regarded as a 
homely interpreter. This is for the following reason. As Blackburn puts it: ‘If we think in 
terms of the homely radical interpreter, we are asking how we determine the facts about 
                                                 
17 As Blackburn puts it, the bleak interpreter is to be regarded as ‘embodying the scientific or 
physicalistic truth about speakers’ (Blackburn 1984, 288). 
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meaning, reference, and the satisfaction conditions of sentences’ (Blackburn 1984, 279).18 I 
take it that the ‘we’ signalled in this remark is a ‘we’ of which there are or may be many 
others (we ‘western liberals’ perhaps). Davidson certainly wanted the conclusions from his 
investigations into the nature of interpretation to be more general than this. As Lepore and 
Ludwig have emphasised, Davidson’s account of radical interpretation ‘aims to be a 
completely general account of interpretation, and hence of meaning, communication etc.’ 
(Lepore and Ludwig 2005, 219). They go on: ‘To take on board as fundamental constraints 
contingent assumptions about the psychology of particular speakers, or groups of speakers, 
would undermine the generality of the results we would hope to obtain from reflection on 
the nature of radical interpretation’. Davidson clearly thinks that consideration of radical 
interpretation can lead us to very general conclusions about the nature of thought. 
It might look then that the claim must be that any psychological assumptions required for 
radical interpretation cannot be contingent, but must be necessary assumptions, 
constitutive of any interpretation whatsoever. That is, whatever psychological or 
anthropological assumptions play a role in interpretation, they must be perfectly general, 
and apply to any speaker or group of speakers. This is in fact sometimes suggested by what 
Davidson says.  
Davidson’s account of interpretation repeatedly emphasises that the successful interpreter 
must match his own norms of rationality to those of the person he is interpreting. 
Significantly, Davidson thinks that every speaker subscribes to the basic principles of 
rationality – at least the principles of decision theory and basic logic – whether explicitly or 
not. Davidson’s claim is that if someone does go against those principles, he ‘goes against his 
own principles’. He says: ‘These are principles shared by all creatures that have propositional 
attitudes or act intentionally; and since I am (I hope) one of those creatures, I can put it this 
way: all thinking creatures subscribe to my basic standards or norms of rationality’ (Davidson 
2004, 195-6). This does, he admits, sound somewhat sweeping. However, he insists that it 
comes to no more than the claim that ‘it is a condition of having thoughts, judgments, and 
intentions that the basic standards of rationality have application’. The standards of rational 
                                                 
18 Compare: ‘If we think in terms of the bleak interpreter, we are asking, as David Lewis put it, how 
the facts determine the facts – how semantic interpretations sit on top of the physical facts about 
things’. 
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consistency are taken to be constitutive of propositional attitudes and thought in the sense 
that unless one is mostly rational, one is not an agent at all.19  
Davidson then is certainly committed to the idea that reflection on radical interpretation can 
yield what might be regarded as perfectly general constraints on mindedness as such. 
However, it is one thing to be committed to this and quite another to be committed to the 
idea that the interpreter of a particular speaker cannot make use of constraints that pertain 
only to minds of a particular local class (how they are brought up, what their biology is like, 
etc.). In other words, it is quite another thing to think that the only constraints that a 
(radical?) interpreter can appeal to in the interpretation of a speaker are perfectly general 
constraints that hold of mindedness as such. Indeed, one of the perfectly general constraints 
on mindedness as such could be that the interpretation of a particular thinker must involve 
appeal to constraints that pertain to the local class of thinkers to which that particular 
thinker belongs.20 
So, while it is one thing to hold that there are general constraints on mindedness, e.g., that 
all minds must meet a standard of logical consistency, it is quite another to think that the 
interpretation of a particular mind cannot appeal to any constraints that are not perfectly 
general. The issue then becomes whether, and to what extent, we can tell the difference 
between constraints on mindedness as such, and constraints that pertain only to minds of a 
local class. I will try and say a little about why I think this issue is important. 
It seems that in order to apply charity across the board, the interpreter must make a variety 
of psychological and anthropological assumptions about the speaker. It follows that an 
account of radical interpretation can either attempt to make these psychological 
assumptions explicit, or will simply end up smuggling them in with concepts such as ‘natural’ 
or ‘normal’. In a later chapter I discuss Susan Hurley’s claim that an interpreter would not be 
in a position to recognise a speaker’s basic desires or preferences, and so the formal values 
of coherence and consistency that they exhibit, unless they shared with the speaker certain 
substantive evaluative and, according to Hurley, recognisably ethical interests. 
At this stage however I just want to make the following point. Once we allow that 
psychological or anthropological assumptions are being made by the interpreter, we seem to 
                                                 
19 This is of course not to imply that no one ever acts contrary to those principles. Charity, or the 
rationality constraint, is not undermined by the fact that people can be highly confused and can 
reason badly (this point is made by Millar 2004, 7). 
20 This point was put to me in conversation by Adrian Haddock. 
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invite the accusation that contingent psychological or anthropological assumptions 
(constraints that pertain only to minds of a particular local class) are being smuggled in 
amongst what are being passed off as necessary assumptions (constraints on mindedness as 
such). This, it seems, will cast doubt on the objective nature of any interpretation of the 
speaker, of the interpreter’s understanding of what the speaker is about. Indeed, it is a long 
standing criticism of Davidson that he restricts the notion of rationality to speakers who are 
to a large extent ‘like us’. 
The worry can be put like this. The radical interpreter is a cognitive imperialist of sorts, who 
imports his own categories and concepts, beliefs and principles, and applies them to the 
utterances and behaviour of the speaker. This however seems to neglect the possibility that 
he may encounter a speaker who has categories and concepts, beliefs and principles that are 
somehow radically different from his own. The extent to which Davidson is embroiled in this 
sort of issue is somewhat unclear. This is in part due to the general issue regarding the 
vagueness of some of Davidson’s formulations of the principle of charity that I raised at the 
end of the preceding section. This issue is also I think linked back to the questions of how 
much and what sort of disagreement with the speaker that the interpreter can tolerate. I will 
come back to these points in subsequent chapters.  
Davidson of course has famously argued that we can make no sense of the idea that there 
might be fundamentally different conceptual schemes. The idea is that we could only tell 
when a speaker was expressing ideas or concepts which were very different to our own once 
we had already managed to interpret them more generally. Davidson wants this point, as 
Blackburn puts it, ‘to sustain the conclusion that we can have no conception of what it might 
be for a speaker to have a language which expresses concepts and beliefs radically different 
from ours – too different to provide the backdrop of shared thoughts that make mutual 
interpretation possible’ (Blackburn 1984, 277). My response to this would be that until we 
have a more substantial account of what this means (what the ‘backdrop of shared thoughts 
that make mutual interpretation possible’ might involve) it might not mean very much.  
6. Summary: 
Most philosophers now acknowledge that there are considerable constraints on 
interpretation of the form that Davidson has set out. In the first part of Chapter 1 I have 
outlined some of Davidson’s claims about radical interpretation. He has argued extensively 
that most of the speaker’s basic beliefs about his environment must be assumed to be true 
by the interpreter. This is a methodological claim about radical interpretation. He has also 
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argued that most of the speaker’s basic perceptual beliefs must in fact be true in order for 
them to be known to the interpreter. This is a more general point about how propositional 
attitudes come to have the content they have. Davidson has also emphasised that there is 
an extent to which the interpreter must take the speaker’s beliefs, attitudes and actions to 
be generally rational and coherent. This constraint is supposed to show that most of the 
beliefs that the interpreter attributes must be true by the interpreter’s lights. There is also 
the point that the propositional attitudes come as a set. 
In the second part of this chapter I have suggested that we should be uneasy about the 
vagueness of Davidson’s suggestion that the interpreter must seek to maximise ‘the right 
sort of agreement’ with the speaker. I have also somewhat more tentatively suggested that 
interpretation necessarily involves entering into the psychology of the speaker in ways that 
may be more problematic than Davidson allows. This follows from Davidson’s insistence that 
charity be applied across the board. I will pick up on both of these issues in subsequent 
chapters.  
In Chapter 2 I will consider how Davidson’s work on radical interpretation is connected to his 
remarks about the nature of values, and what its implications might be for ethics in 
particular. The central idea is that the principle of charity must play much the same role in 
the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken to 
show that certain general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which 
Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to 
values as well as beliefs. 
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Chapter Two: Interpretation and Values 
In Chapter 1 I set out some of the key features of Davidson’s work on radical interpretation. 
In Chapter 2 I will consider in more detail how Davidson’s work on radical interpretation is 
connected to his remarks about values. In a series of later papers Davidson developed the 
idea that the attributions of desires, preferences and values to any speaker must be 
governed by the principle of charity in much the same way that the principle must govern 
the attribution of beliefs to any speaker. In fact, even in his earlier work Davidson would 
often speak of the idea that charity must be applied to propositional attitudes ‘across the 
board’. I take it that this is the central idea that underwrites Davidson’s remarks about 
values, and ethics more specifically.21 
This aspect of Davidson’s work has in fact not been the subject of a great deal of secondary 
literature. This is somewhat surprising as there seems to be a degree of promise to the idea 
that we might try to understand something of what people say and think about values in 
particular by looking at how we come to attribute values to them. I will consider how this 
central idea might be understood in terms of the principle of correspondence and the 
principle of coherence that were set out in Chapter 1. I will argue that there is prima facie 
plausibility to the idea that the role of the principle of charity in the attribution of values to a 
speaker will be similar to the role of the principle of charity in the attribution of beliefs to 
the speaker. I will then go on to discuss what might follow from this idea. One thing that 
might be thought to follow is that certain claims about propositional attitudes quite 
generally, which Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, will 
apply specifically to evaluative and ethical judgments. I will suggest there is an important 
limitation to Davidson’s approach as it is set out.  
1. The Argument from Interpretation: 
In this section I will look at Davidson’s claim that the principle of charity must play much the 
same role in the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This 
claim is connected to the idea that the consideration of radical interpretation can yield 
important insights into how the content of propositional attitudes is determined. I will 
consider the potential implications of this claim with respect to the key aspects of charity 
                                                 
21 I will refer to Davidson’s arguments for this idea under the broad tittle of the ‘argument from 
interpretation’ hereafter. 
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which were separated out in the previous chapter under the titles of correspondence and 
coherence. 
The principle of correspondence emphasises the significance of the causal connections that 
link the interpreter, the speaker, and the shared world. In the case of basic perceptual 
beliefs, there seem to be two separable claims. Firstly, the interpreter must assume that the 
speaker is largely correct in his beliefs about his immediate environment (by the 
interpreter’s lights). This is what I called in Chapter 1 the methodological claim. Secondly, 
any speaker must in fact be largely correct about his beliefs about his immediate 
environment, or about his most basic perceptual beliefs generally. This is what I called in 
Chapter 1 the epistemological claim. Both of these claims are supported by causal 
considerations. 
The argument behind the first claim is this. In the radical interpretation scenario, the 
interpreter must initially identify objects (where this is inclusive of entities or events) which 
are common to himself and to the speaker, and assume that what the speaker is caused to 
believe by those objects (in most cases) is what the interpreter would be caused to believe 
by those same objects. For example, in a straightforward case, the interpreter ‘can do no 
better than to interpret a sentence that a person is selectively caused to hold true by the 
presence of rain as meaning that it is raining’ (Davidson 2004, 36). It is only because the 
interpreter ‘consciously correlates the responses of another creature with objects and 
events in the observer’s world’ that there is any basis for saying that the speaker is 
responding to one object in his surroundings rather than another (Davidson 2001, 212-3). 
Davidson acknowledges of course that this rule can accommodate numerous exceptions, but 
maintains that to ignore it is simply to abandon interpretation altogether (cf. Davidson 2004, 
36). 
Davidson has maintained that the same rule must apply when the interpreter attributes 
evaluative attitudes or judgments to the speaker. Again, the interpreter must identify 
objects (entities or events) common to himself and the speaker, and assume that the 
speaker’s response is (in most cases) similar to the interpreter’s own response to these 
objects. It is worth emphasising (as was pointed out in Chapter 1) that there are two distinct 
assumptions in play here. Firstly, the interpreter is prompted to take the speaker to be 
responding to the same object as he is. Secondly, the interpreter is prompted to assume that 
the speaker responds to those features of the world in more or less the same way the 
interpreter himself responds. The idea is that the interpreter must make both of these 
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assumptions in order to make a start at interpreting the speaker. Remember, Davidson says 
that ‘unless we assume that we can identify and share reactions to common stimuli ‘thought 
and speech would have no particular content – that is no content at all’. (Davidson 2001c, 
214). 
The argument behind the second claim is this. Davidson claims that the content of any 
speaker’s earliest and most basic sentences must be determined by what it is in the world 
that causes him to hold them true. Consideration of radical interpretation suggests this, as it 
shows the observation of the circumstances in which the speaker utters a sentence (or 
applies a predicate) is basic to the understanding of the utterance. The idea is that a speaker 
must learn his most basic words, words like ‘apple’, ‘man’, ‘dog’ etc., which at the start 
function as sentences, through a conditioning verbal behaviour to specific objects in the 
environment. According to Davidson, the speaker learns to understand evaluative attitudes 
and judgements in much the same way. Consider for example the following simple 
sentences: ‘Good!’, ‘Bad!’, ‘Evil!’, ‘Brave!’ ‘Cruel!’ etc. The interpreter learns that these 
utterances ‘apply to actions and objects of the sorts of things to which we find them applied’ 
(Davidson 2004, 48). Davidson describes this view as the view that values are ‘rooted in 
things’. The view is that the content of a thinker’s values or value judgements (as with our 
thoughts or sayings generally) is partly determined by the history of his causal interactions 
with the environment. In the simplest and most basic cases, words and sentences derive 
their meanings from the objects and circumstances in which they are learned, and this 
applies to basic evaluative words and sentences too. The objects and circumstances in which 
basic words and sentences are learned are thus content fixing. 
For Davidson then, what ensures that a speaker’s view of the world, in its plainest features, 
is largely correct ‘is that the stimuli that cause our most basic verbal responses also 
determine what those responses mean, and the content of the beliefs that accompany 
them’ (Davidson 2001c, 204). Further, Davidson thinks this can be shown by ‘appealing to 
obvious facts about language learning and facts about how we interpret words and 
languages with which we are unfamiliar’ (Davidson 2001c, 43-45).22 Davidson seems to 
acknowledge that the interpretation of evaluations can be subjected to more additional 
considerations than simple beliefs when this general rule is applied. Nevertheless, he 
                                                 
22 Of course, not all words and sentences are learned in this way. Often words and sentences are 
learned via their relation to other words and sentences. Further, any given belief or utterance may be 
caused by misleading sensations. But, in the simplest and most basic cases words and sentences 
derive their meaning from the objects and circumstances in which they are learned, and ‘it is those 
that are that anchor language to the world’ (Davidson 2001c, 44-45). 
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maintains that with evaluations as well as beliefs there must be ‘the general presumption 
(he adds ‘often overridden by other considerations’) that similar causes beget similar 
responses in the interpreter and the interpreted’ (Davidson 2004, 71). It is in fact difficult to 
overstate the importance of this point when we consider Davidson’s account of values. In 
one place Davidson says: ‘What makes our judgments of the "descriptive" properties of 
things true or false is the fact that the same properties tend to cause the same beliefs in 
different observers, and when observers differ, we assume there is an explanation. This is 
not just a platitude, it's a tautology, one whose truth is ensured by how we interpret 
people's beliefs. My thesis is that the same holds for moral values’ (Davidson 2004, 47). 
The principle of coherence concerns more general holistic constraints on the attributions of 
propositional attitudes. Charity dictates that the interpreter’s attributions of belief to a 
speaker must be consistent with each other and with certain general principles of rationality. 
Some of the implications of this were discussed in Chapter 1. We saw for instance that 
Davidson has used these considerations to argue that most of the propositional attitudes 
that an interpreter attributes to a speaker must be true by the interpreter’s lights. Davidson 
has also suggested that the interpreter must find a similar degree of coherence and 
consistency (both intra-attitudinal and inter-attitudinal) in the evaluative attitudes and 
judgments of the speaker. This general remark could be thought to contain a number of 
elements which relate to how the content of evaluative attitudes and judgments is 
constrained by the principle of charity. 
There is, one might think, a general holistic point about the content of values which relates 
to what could be called evaluative concepts23. This is just to say that in order to attribute a 
belief about justice, say, to a speaker, the interpreter would have to at the same time 
attribute lots of beliefs about justice to the speaker. (Remember the remarks about snakes 
in Chapter 1). So, where the interpreter is prompted to attribute a belief that contains an 
evaluative concept, he must also be prompted to attribute lots of generally true beliefs 
which involve that evaluative concept, and possibly other related concepts. Davidson does 
say in one place that any speaker (any creature capable of thought and action) ‘must have 
the concepts of the evaluative properties, and must employ these concepts in making 
judgement’ (Davidson 2005, 55). It remains to be seen whether the interpreter must endow 
the speaker with some minimal set of specifically ethical or moral concepts and interests. 
                                                 
23 For now we can think in terms of a very broad class of evaluative concepts inclusive of ethical and 
aesthetic concepts, though distinctions in this class will become relevant further on. 
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Quite a lot seems to hinge on this issue. Davidson’s list includes ethical concepts, but it is 
very important to keep in mind that this needs arguing.24 
Davidson has stressed that the interpreter must find certain formal constraints among the 
desires and preferences of the speaker at a structural level. For example, he has often 
highlighted the fact that the interpreter will find it hard to credit even the most blatant 
evidence for the intransitivity of preference, noting that the interpreter would tend to 
explain such cases as being the result of changes in preference over time. In fact, in one 
place he claims that ‘the constraints that a Bayesian theory of preference places on the 
pattern of beliefs and evaluations exert a prima facie claim on interpretation; consistency of 
preferences with one another and with beliefs is a constitutive pressure on interpretation 
simply because we cannot rationalise (i.e., explain or understand) deviations from it’ 
(Davidson 2004, 71).  The idea, as Lillehammer has put it, is that ‘rational agents must exhibit 
a basic level of instrumental consistency in order for propositional attitudes to be intelligible 
as reasons explanatory of action. In particular, rational agents must be interpretable as 
pursuing their desires in accordance with their beliefs’ (Lillehammer 2007, 206).  
There is also sometimes the suggestion that the interpreter could not recognise a speaker’s 
desires or preferences at all unless he shared certain specific and substantive moral or 
ethical interests with the speaker. The point might be put in the following way. The 
Davidsonian conception of rationality (the ‘constitutive idea of rationality’) does not simply 
involve the sort of formal constraints mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It is also 
substantive, and contains at a fundamental and structural level certain substantive shared 
ethical interests and concepts. What might be shown to follow from this thought, or how far 
these evaluative attitudes or interests can ever be made explicit, is never entirely clear in 
Davidson’s work. In work that leans heavily on Davidson’s own, Susan Hurley has developed 
the argument that any interpreter must attribute certain substantive and recognisably 
ethical evaluative interests to a speaker even in the course of crediting them with basic 
desires and preferences.  This is because, Hurley claims, it is only by reference to some sense 
of the speaker’s substantive and ethical values, to what the speaker thinks important and 
worthwhile, that an interpreter could give content to those desires and preferences. Must 
the interpreter find that any speaker must share specific ethical concerns, or as Williams has 
                                                 
24 A big difference with the case of ethical concepts (as opposed to, say, snakes) is that speakers 
disagree about the nature of the concepts themselves. That is, there are disagreements about what 
justice, say, is as well as what it demands and whether or not it is instantiated. So the interpreter has 
to attribute to the speaker not only beliefs which involve the concept, but a belief about the concept 
itself.  
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put it ‘a sense of what we think important, laudable, hateful, to be condemned or despised 
and so forth, in the actions and reactions of human beings’ (Williams 1995, 139)? I will 
discuss Hurley’s claim, and the question posed by Williams, in detail in Chapter 4.  
However, for the time being we might remain neutral about the precise implications that 
these holistic constraints have on the interpreter’s interpretations of the evaluative 
attitudes and judgements of the speaker, while agreeing that it seems difficult to deny that 
the interpreter must find the speaker to have certain basic evaluative attitudes: wants, 
desires, preferences etc. Furthermore, it seems plausible that the interpreter must assume 
that these evaluative attitudes interact with the speaker’s other attitudes and with the 
speaker’s beliefs and intentions (and actions) in an instrumental way – otherwise they would 
not be wants, desires, preferences etc.  
We should accept I think that there is some prima facie plausibility to the idea that the role 
of the principle of charity in the attribution of beliefs to a speaker will be similar to the role 
of the principle of charity in the attribution of values to the speaker. Indeed, it is perhaps 
difficult to imagine that an interpreter could interpret the beliefs of a speaker in isolation 
from the evaluative attitudes and judgements of a speaker, due to the intimate connections 
that exist between the different types of propositional attitudes.25 
Initially, the speaker must be regarded as forming evaluative attitudes and judgements with 
the same contents as those of the interpreter when confronted with the same or similar 
features of the world. The interpreter must assume commonality as a starting point, this is a 
methodological necessity for any understanding of the values of the speaker. Perhaps, also, 
the interpreter must expect that at least some these sentences and concepts are ‘rooted’ in 
the objects and circumstances which lead to their utterance or application, as is the case 
with many basic sentences more generally. Further, these evaluative attitudes and 
judgements will be further understood in terms of their place in an intricate overall pattern 
of thought and behaviour. This pattern provides certain constraints on the attitudes that an 
interpreter can intelligibly attribute to a speaker. The interpreter would for example struggle 
to understand a speaker who announced that they preferred A to B and B to A, because this 
is not how preferences work. Equally, the interpreter would struggle to understand a 
                                                 
25 This idea does not seem to be out of keeping with Davidson’s earliest work on radical 
interpretation. Davidson’s later remarks on the connections between interpretation and our 
understanding of value have been presented as an ‘argument by analogy’ (cf. Ludwig Reference) or as 
an extension of the principle of charity to values. My view is that these remarks are perhaps best 
understood as a more detailed articulation of ideas which were always to some extent implicit. 
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speaker who sincerely claimed to prefer A to B but who, whenever faced with a free choice 
between A and B consistently chose B, because preferences are understood to relate to 
actions in a certain way. 
Reflection on the nature of radical interpretation could then shed light on certain features of 
our evaluative attitudes and concepts. The view is that the content of evaluative attitudes or 
judgements (as with thoughts or sayings generally) is partly constrained by the history of the 
thinker’s causal interactions with the environment and partly constrained by holistic and 
rational considerations. The precise implications of these general points are somewhat less 
clear. The idea that the principle of charity plays a role in the attribution of values to a 
speaker is in some ways more problematic than the above remarks suggest. As Davidson was 
of course well aware, there are basic differences between evaluative attitudes and 
judgements and beliefs, and between evaluative concepts and other sorts of concepts, and 
we might expect that these differences will have to be reflected in our account of 
interpretation. 
2. The General Presumption of Truth and Coherence: 
One thing that might be thought to follow from the above remarks is that certain claims 
about propositional attitudes quite generally, which Davidson thinks follow from the 
consideration of radical interpretation, will apply to evaluative judgments. Indeed, Davidson 
suggests that the reflection on the nature of radical interpretation, and particularly on the 
role of the principle of charity, can support the conclusion that such judgements are true or 
false in much the same way that descriptive judgments are, and that there is more 
agreement on moral and other values than it may often seem (Cf. Davidson 2004, 44).  
This is in part because reflection on radical interpretation sheds light on how such judgments 
get their content. Davidson has often emphasised how considerations of coherence and 
consistency constrain the content of propositional attitudes more generally. The emphasis 
on coherence is used to support the claim that the interpreter cannot attribute any belief to 
a speaker without attributing lots of other beliefs with related content. This can be 
generalised to the claim that most of the beliefs attributed to the speaker must be true in 
the interpreter’s opinion. There is then, as Davidson has occasionally claimed, a ‘general 
presumption’ in favour of the truth and consistency of a speaker’s beliefs, judgments and 
attitudes which emerges from the consideration of the principle of coherence (cf. Davidson 
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2001c, 153). According to Davidson, all of a thinker’s beliefs and attitudes are justified in so 
far as they are supported by numerous other beliefs and attitudes.26 
Davidson has strengthened this claim by arguing that the presumption in favour of any given 
belief is increased the larger the body of other beliefs with which it coheres. The idea is that 
the more central or significant a given belief is within the overall network of beliefs, the 
more difficult it becomes to coherently raise doubts about the belief. It would be difficult for 
example to continue working in certain areas of physics while casting aside E=MC2. Of course 
some seemingly ‘central’ or ‘significant’ beliefs, which might appear to cohere with a great 
many other beliefs that the speaker appears to hold, could still be held false by the 
interpreter: that the world is flat, that a woman’s place is in the home, that God is Great etc. 
Nevertheless, Davidson has in fact gone as far as to claim that the consideration of the 
interconnected nature of belief (and propositional attitudes more generally) can rescue us 
from a certain form of general scepticism by showing that it is unintelligible that all or most 
of the beliefs of any thinker could be false or inconsistent.27  
Some philosophers have been suspicious of Davidson’s move from the claim that the 
interpreter must find most of the speaker’s beliefs to be true to the claim that most of these 
beliefs must in fact be true. It has been argued that the sort of holistic constraints on 
interpretation that Davidson has emphasised might permit the conclusion that no 
interpreter could correctly interpret a speaker in such a way that the speaker’s beliefs came 
out as massively false in the interpreter’s opinion. What follows from this is more 
controversial. It is often suggested that these holistic constraints on mental content which 
Davidson has emphasised do not permit the conclusion that no thinker’s beliefs could turn 
out to be massively false. 
Davidson was certainly aware that coherence on its own is not enough to justify any 
presumption about the truth of beliefs about what exists, for example. If the interpreter 
were to correctly attribute a belief about a snake to a speaker, they would have to attribute 
many other true beliefs about snakes to the speaker (that it would have no arms or legs 
etc.). However, as Davidson has put it, such truths are ‘general truths’ and ‘general truths 
                                                 
26 From the interpreter’s point of view there must be a general presumption of truth for the body of 
beliefs as a whole, though the interpreter does not need to presume that each particular belief of a 
speaker is true. From the vantage point of each thinker ‘there must be a graded presumption in 
favour of each of his own beliefs’ (cf. Davidson 2001c, 153). 
27 He once put the point about consistency thus: ‘There is no chance that a person’s beliefs will not 
tend to be consistent, since beliefs are individuated in part by their logical properties: what is not 
largely consistent with many other beliefs cannot be identified as a belief’ (Davidson 2001b, 155). 
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like these do no imply that snakes exist, but only that if there were a snake, then it would 
have no arms or legs’ (Davidson 2004, 17). The coherence of a belief with a substantial body 
of beliefs then only enhances its chance of being true provided that there is a reason to 
suppose that the body of beliefs is true (or at least largely so). The point here however, as he 
once put it, is that coherence on its own, no matter how strongly defined, cannot guarantee 
that what is believed is largely the case (Cf. Davidson 2001c, 138). 
What then does guarantee that what is believed is largely the case? The answer Davidson 
offers should not be at all surprising. The central idea was sketched in Chapter 1 and again 
briefly above in the remarks about correspondence and causation. To repeat a claim I 
highlighted earlier, what ensures that a speaker’s view of the world is largely correct in its 
plainest features is that the stimuli that cause his most basic verbal responses also 
determine what those responses mean, and the content of the beliefs that accompany 
them. The idea then is that any coherent set of beliefs that a speaker might have must be 
suitably anchored to the world, and that this anchoring is content fixing.  For Davidson, the 
nature of interpretation guarantees that a large number of our simplest perceptual beliefs 
are true by giving us an account of how such beliefs get their content. 
We might then re-state Davidson’s general presumption in the following way. Firstly, all of a 
thinker’s beliefs are justified to some extent in the sense that they are supported by 
numerous other beliefs and attitudes. Secondly, most of any thinker’s basic beliefs are 
anchored to the world, because the contents of these beliefs must in part be determined by 
the history of the thinker’s causal interactions with the world. Again, in the simplest and 
most basic cases, words and sentences derive their meaning from the objects and 
circumstances in which they are learned. 
It is fair to say that there remains a considerable degree of scepticism about the significance 
of Davidson’s epistemological claims, or about the significance of the ‘general presumption’ 
more particularly. Simon Blackburn, for example, has appeared to suggest that Davidson 
struggles to avoid ‘pure coherentism’ and, by implication, idealism about mental content (cf. 
Blackburn, in McDonald, C. and McDonald, G. ed. 2006). 
I feel that Blackburn and others are being uncharitable in this respect. Davidson has 
repeatedly tried to distance himself from the sort of ‘pure coherentism’ that seems to be at 
issue here.28 Further, as Davidson himself has remarked, it is hard to believe that the sort of 
                                                 
28 Cf. Davidson 2001c, xvi: ‘I would…like to correct the impression that I think experience and 
perception play no role in our beliefs about the world…I made it sound as if I were repudiating all 
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direct interaction between language users and their surroundings is not part of any proper 
account of how words are related to things. In the simplest and most basic cases words and 
sentences appear to derive their meaning from the objects and circumstances in which they 
are learned, and thinking about radical interpretation gives us a good account of why and 
how this is so. As Davidson has stressed repeatedly, a sentence which a speaker has been 
conditioned to hold true by the presence of fires, for example, will be true when there is a 
fire present: a word which a speaker has been conditioned to be caused to hold applicable 
by the presence of rain will refer to rain.29 Again, many words and sentences are not learned 
this way, but ‘it is those that are that anchor language to the world’ (Davidson 2001c, 44-45). 
It does not seem to me like Davidson’s account of the method of radical interpretation 
leaves him vulnerable to the accusation of ‘pure coherentism’ or idealism about mental 
content. Indeed, the accusation seems to neglect a fundamental component of Davidson’s 
account. It is a crucial part of Davidson’s understanding of radical interpretation that the 
contents of any mind will depend on the causal relations, whatever they may be, between 
the mind and the world.30 Whether or not we can be completely satisfied with Davidson’s 
attempts to articulate word-world relations, and with the conclusions that he draws from 
these attempts is another matter. 
I can put this point another way. For Davidson, providing a proper account of the semantics 
of a speaker’s language forces an interpreter to engage with the ontology of the language. 
Indeed, Davidson moves from claims about semantics to substantial claims about ontology, 
about the sort of things that exist. Primarily, his arguments suggest that the correct 
interpretation of a speaker’s language by an interpreter must result in a large degree of 
agreement about what we might call basic ontology. However I have my doubts about the 
moves that Davidson appears to make from this claim to certain other claims, particularly his 
claims about ethical judgements. 
These doubts can I think be expressed in slightly more general terms. The principle of charity 
appears to provide a certain ‘blanketing’ quality that is thought to render all substantive 
                                                 
serious commerce between the world and mind…My thesis is that the connection is causal, and in the 
case of perception, direct’. 
29 Of course, it is more problematic to say that ‘a word which one has been conditioned to be caused 
to hold applicable by the presence of a Kraut’ will refer to Krauts. 
30 The world here is taken to include other thinker’s. Further, for Davidson causality is not restricted 
to the physical. Mental objects can interact causally with each other and are constrained by 
rationality. They can also interact causally with physical objects. So when Davidson is talking about 
properties causing attitudes, this is not necessarily understood in purely physical terms. 
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beliefs or propositional attitudes presumptively true, or perhaps that is thought to render all 
substantive beliefs about what exists presumptively true. However, any general 
presumption in favour of the truth of beliefs or propositional attitudes will simply shift the 
focus to the truth of specific beliefs or propositional attitudes. 
That is to say, we can accept the general connection between interpretation and basic 
ontology that Davidson has provided. However, given the worries I raised in the previous 
chapter about the vagueness of ‘the right sort of agreement’ we can cast doubt on some of 
his more substantial claims which seem to follow from this. How much and what sort of 
agreement there must be is crucial. Specifically, we can’t get from any general claim about 
agreement on basic ontology to a specific claim about a core of agreement on what exists 
when we consider ethical properties. It seems to be the latter point that is important for 
what Davidson says about ethics. 
Davidson claims that as long as we ‘adhere to the basic intuition that in the simplest and 
most methodologically basic cases words refer to what causes them, it is clear that it cannot 
happen that most of our plainest beliefs about what exists in the world can be false.’ But he 
immediately acknowledges that many beliefs are given content by their relation to further 
beliefs, or are caused by misleading sensations, and remarks that ‘any particular belief or set 
of beliefs about the world around us may be false’ (Davidson 2001c, 214). So, I want to 
suggest, granting Davidson’s general presumption in favour of the truth of our beliefs or 
attitudes does not seem to prevent the possibility that some specific set of beliefs or 
attitudes, for example beliefs or attitudes about ethics, about aesthetics or about religious 
matters, may generally be false or misguided. 
Perhaps we can say that this general presumption applies unless we have specific reasons to 
doubt some particular area of discourse. The general presumption can give us that at least. 
(My beliefs about tables or trees are assumed in general to be true because in part because I 
have no reason to doubt them.) However, many people have argued that there are good 
reasons for doubting the truth or objectivity of judgements and attitudes in certain 
particular areas of discourse. More specifically, there are people who think that there are 
good reasons for regarding ethical or moral judgments as largely false or indeterminate, or 
as falling short of some standard of objectivity. I will say more about this in the following 
chapter.  
The key idea at this stage is that, according to Davidson, there is a general presumption that 
the beliefs of any speaker are largely true, because there is a general presumption that the 
44 | P a g e  
 
basic beliefs of any speaker are largely true.  But that point alone does not fix it which beliefs 
are the true ones, and so seems to leave it open that there might be a philosophical 
significant class of beliefs none of which are true, for example the ethical ones.   
Davidson clearly wants to insist not only that ethical or moral judgements are properly 
understood as being objective (that is, true or false), but also that a majority of them must 
be true (that ‘there is more agreement about them than there may seem’). My claim at this 
stage is that whatever the significance of Davidson’s argument from interpretation, and the 
general presumption that follows from it, it does not seem to secure the objectivity of 
ethical judgments or the claim that many or most ethical judgements must be true. Even if 
we accept the general presumption (about thought generally and perceptual beliefs in 
particular) we can still raise certain worries about the status or nature of evaluative attitudes 
and judgments, or more specifically ethical attitudes and judgements.  
Davidson has suggested that once we are clear about how value judgements acquire content 
we should lose interest in the ontological issues that are traditionally associated with 
questions regarding objectivity in ethics. I believe that this is an exaggeration. In one place 
he says: ‘What cannot be the case is that our general picture of the world and our place in it 
is mistaken, for it is this picture which informs the rest of our beliefs and makes them 
intelligible, whether they be true or false’ (Davidson 2001c, 214). The key issue, it seems to 
me, is whether or not our ‘general picture of the world and our place in it’ necessarily 
includes certain ethical interests or concerns, properties or concepts.  
Above I suggested that it remains to be seen whether the interpreter must endow the 
speaker with some minimal set of specifically ethical or moral concepts and interests. 
(Davidson’s list includes ethical concepts, but it is very important to keep in mind that this 
needs arguing.) A great deal seems to hinge on this issue. For it seems that to grant 
Davidson’s general presumption is to accept that there are a broad class of ‘basic beliefs’ 
which must have some true instances (i.e., it cannot be that on every occasion on which 
someone holds a belief of this sort, the belief is false), because their content is determined 
by what causes them. The question then is whether or not an interpreter must include 
amongst these basic beliefs not simply beliefs about the colours and shapes of things, but 
beliefs about the ‘ethical properties’ of things (i.e. as given by thick ethical concepts). I take 
it that while nothing in Davidson’s account of radical interpretation as I have presented it 
rules this out, nothing has established it either.  
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I want to suggest however that it is doubtful that Davidson could derive substantial 
conclusions about ethics from an a priori argument from interpretation without this point, 
that is without including beliefs about ethical properties amongst ‘basic beliefs’. To some 
extent the whole ethical import of Davidson’s account of radical interpretation hangs on this 
claim, which I am associating with the idea that a degree of concern for certain ethical 
properties is a condition of mindedness as such. My view, which I aim to develop in the 
subsequent chapters, is that if Davidson attempts to include concern for certain ethical 
properties amongst the constraints on mindedness as such that are general requirements of 
all interpretation, he is likely to leave himself open to the suspicions about smuggling that I 
raised briefly in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 3: Interpretation and Value Properties 
In Chapter 2 have argued that there is prima facie plausibility to the idea that the principle of 
charity must play a role in the interpretation of a speaker’s values. Indeed it is perhaps 
difficult to imagine that an interpreter could interpret the beliefs of a speaker in isolation 
from the values of a speaker. Davidson however at times moves from this general point to 
make a number of more substantial claims about values, and about ethical judgements in 
particular.  
These claims appear to draw some support from Davidson’s argument that there must be a 
‘general presumption’ in favour of the truth and coherence of the propositional attitudes of 
any thinker. I have summarised the key components of the argument for this general 
presumption in the following way: Firstly, most of a thinker’s beliefs and attitudes must be 
justified to the extent that they are supported by numerous other beliefs and attitudes 
which make up a largely coherent and rational set. Secondly, most of a thinker’s basic 
propositional attitudes are anchored to the world, because the contents of those 
propositional attitudes must in part be fixed by the history of the thinker’s causal 
interactions with the world.  
The general idea is that any coherent set of propositional attitudes that a thinker can have 
must be anchored to the world, and that this anchoring is content fixing. This in turn fixes it 
that any thinker must have mostly true beliefs. Towards the end of Chapter 2 I suggested 
that it seems that to grant Davidson’s general presumption is to accept that there are a class 
of ‘basic beliefs’ (perhaps mostly of the form ‘a is F’) which must have some true instances 
because their content is determined by what causes them. That is to say, it cannot be the 
case that on every occasion on which a thinker holds a basic belief of this sort, the belief is 
false. Davidson of course acknowledges that the content of a great many other beliefs can 
be given by their relation to further beliefs, or are caused by misleading sensations, and 
remarks that ‘any particular belief or set of beliefs about the world around us may be false’ 
(Davidson 2001c, 2014).  
I also suggested that if this is true, then granting Davidson’s general presumption does not 
seem to prevent the possibility that some specific set of beliefs or attitudes, for example 
about ethics, religion or pseudo-science (e.g. phrenology, astrology), may in general be false 
or misguided. The general presumption by itself does not fix which propositional attitudes 
are true or correct, and so seems to leave it open that there might be a philosophically 
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significant class of propositional attitudes none of which are true or correct, e.g., the ethical 
judgments. That is to say that whatever the significance of Davidson’s general presumption, 
it does not as it stands do enough to secure a claim to which Davidson appears to be 
committed – that most ethical judgments must be true, and that there is more agreement 
on ethical matters than there might seem to be.  
Whether Davidson’s general presumption rules out the possibility I have just mentioned 
depends, it seems to me, on whether or not the general presumption can be spelled out in 
such a way as to include ethical judgments, or concern with ethical concepts, amongst the 
‘basic beliefs’. That is, the issue is whether or not the interpreter is constrained so as to 
include amongst the basic beliefs of any thinker not simply beliefs about the colours or 
shapes of objects for example, but beliefs about certain ethical properties of objects. This is 
perhaps what Davidson has in mind when he says that ‘values are rooted in things’. 
However, nothing in Davidson’s work as I have presented it up to this point seems to have 
established this yet. 
The idea is that, according to Davidson, it seems to be a condition for being a thinker (a 
‘condition of mindedness as such’) that thinkers have ethical beliefs amongst their basic 
beliefs. My aim in what follows is to put some pressure on this idea. I will argue that nothing 
in Davidson’s blanketing ontological claims can secure this point. I will then go on to argue 
that a full understanding of ethical properties suggests that they are unlikely candidates for 
featuring amongst the ‘basic beliefs’ of all thinkers, or for playing a role in ‘constraints on 
mindedness as such’. I will also suggest that the fact that the nature of ethical properties 
leaves open a number of questions regarding ethical objectivity which Davidson fails to 
address. I will start however by putting Davidson’s remarks about values in a wider 
philosophical context. To this end, I will place Davidson’s remarks about value judgments 
and statements in the context of some well-known issues that are raised by non-cognitivist 
and error theoretic approaches to values.  
1. Non-Cognitivism and Error Theory: 
Straightforward belief statements are understood to have cognitive content, to be true or 
false. It is sometimes thought to be less clear that this is the case for statements that express 
value judgements. There is a large body of work in ethical philosophy which holds that many 
or all value judgements do not in fact have truth values. I have in mind the non-cognitivists 
of various sorts who have argued that statements such as ‘setting the cat on fire is cruel’ 
should not be understood as having truth conditions at all.  They claim that such statements 
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are not in the business of expressing judgements which are true or false in any substantial 
sense– they are not typically expressing states of mind which are like beliefs or which are 
cognitive in the way that beliefs are. Statements of this kind should not, according to the 
non-cognitivist, be understood as predicating properties at all, but should rather be 
understood as expressing attitudes. They are in fact expressing non-cognitive attitudes more 
similar to desire, approval or disapproval31. It should not be particularly surprising to anyone 
who is familiar with Davidson’s wider work in the philosophy of language that he, along with 
many others, thought that this approach is mistaken and that ethical judgments and ethical 
statements simply must be regarded as true or false, and for a number of reasons.  
The general line that he takes with non-cognitivism is to insist that these value statements 
must have truth conditions in virtue of their form. In more than one place he urges us to 
consider what exactly it is that we do when we judge that an action or event is ‘good’, ‘evil’, 
‘morally desirable’, ‘obligatory’, ‘cruel’ etc. He stresses that when we do this for even a 
moment ‘the semantic nature of such judgements becomes clear’ (cf. Davidson 2004, 48). 
We must be attributing some property or other to an entity or group of entities. This is to 
say that when we state that ‘setting the cat on fire is cruel’ this can only mean that we 
attribute the property ‘is cruel’ to the event ‘setting the cat on fire’ (that is, we attribute 
some property to the subject of the sentence). Such statements may be true or false but 
they must have truth conditions – either the subject of the sentence (the entity or event) 
has the property or it doesn’t. To think otherwise would, according to Davidson, be to 
‘bifurcate language in an unacceptable way’ by leaving the semantics of sentences which 
express value judgements detached from the semantics of other types of sentences (cf. 
Davidson 2004, 25). 
Davidson held that there are numerous other considerations that support this conclusion. To 
this end he has at various times highlighted the logical form of compound sentences, 
generalisations and embedded sentences. Take for example his discussion of the nature of 
compound sentences. When a speaker says ‘I ought to give more money to charity and I will 
do so in future’ nobody would doubt that the second conjunct of this statement has a truth 
value, is true or false. Davidson challenges us then to explain what ‘and’ could mean in this 
                                                 
31 Most philosophers who work under the ‘non-cognitivist’ banner occupy subtle positions within the 
general outline I provide. As van Roojen remarks, ‘many non-cognitivists hold that while primary 
function of evaluative judgements is not to express beliefs, they may express them in a secondary 
way. Others deny that their contents are true or false in any robust sense but not that they can be 
true or false in a deflationary sense according to which there is no substantial property separating 
true and false sentences’ (van Roojen 2009).  
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statement. He says that no one has explained the role of a conjunction except by saying ‘a 
conjunction is true if and only if each conjunct is. It follows that the first conjunct is true if 
the sentence as a whole is’ (Davidson 2004, 48). 
Davidson has also cited the role of value judgements in practical reasoning as further 
support for his position. When we reason about what to do or about the value of our actions 
or the actions of others, we will often combine value judgements with other types of 
judgement and beliefs. We conclude from our judgement that the eradication of poverty 
would be good and our belief that giving money to charity will help eradicate poverty, that 
we should (if we can) give money to charity. If practical reasoning of this sort can be shown 
in some cases to be valid, Davidson argues that the ‘premises and conclusion must have 
truth values, as validity is defined as a truth preserving mode of reasoning’ (cf. Davidson 
2004, 55). 
In light of these considerations and many others, Davidson has urged that we must face the 
fact that it is, as he puts it, ‘difficult, if not impossible’ to avoid the conclusion that value 
judgments have truth values. This holds without an insistence that value judgements are 
exactly like other types of judgements or beliefs (though they may be regarded as a class of 
belief), or a denial of the many differences between evaluative concepts and other types of 
concepts. The types of argument for this claim just sketched follow naturally from 
Davidson’s longstanding emphasis on the importance of the distinction between questions 
of the logical form or grammar of sentences and the analysis of individual concepts. The 
deep differences between descriptive and value statements do not show at the level of the 
former, hence we should not baulk at the idea that value judgements have truth conditions 
and truth values.  
I think that we should be willing to grant that at the level of logical form value judgements or 
statements poses no special problem for Davidson’s account of interpretation32. By this I 
simply mean that we can understand value judgments or statements as being true or false 
(or perhaps neither), and recognise that the speaker holds them true or false. It seems 
however that we might hold this view even if we think that there are good reasons for 
regarding some sets of judgements or statements, for example ethical judgments or 
statements, as being mostly false or indeterminate because of the nature of the concepts or 
                                                 
32 For my purposes here I need only to have provided a sketch of the sort of reasoning behind 
Davidson’s rejection of certain forms of non-cognitivsm. I think Davidson’s arguments are good ones, 
but I do not need to claim that he has presented a conclusive case against all forms of non-cognitivsm.  
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properties involved. And in fact many worries about the truth values of evaluative 
judgements are found at the level of conceptual analysis.  
As Bernard Williams argued in an late essay, that ethical statements are statements is 
suggested by the fact that  ‘they are involved in speech acts of the assertive kind, they 
permit embedding and various other kinds of syntactic manipulation which are associated 
with the sorts of things that are statements, assertions, bearers of truth value’. Further, 
these ‘surface facts’ about semantics, as we might call them, will have to be honoured in any 
account of ethical statements. However, Williams went on to insist that many of the 
substantive questions in ethics ‘about realism, objectivism, cognitivism, and so on’ are 
questions not just about the existence of the surface facts, nor indeed about the adequacy 
of the surface facts to support the application of the word ‘true’ (Williams 1995a, 242). In a 
similar vein, and many years earlier, Michael Dummett famously suggested that the really 
important issues in ethics do not concern whether in practice the words ‘true’ or ‘false’ are 
applied to value statements, but whether, if they are so applied, ‘the point of doing so would 
be the same as the point of applying them to statements of other kinds, and, if not, in what 
ways it would be different’ (Dummett 1959). 
One way to articulate the idea that ethical judgments could be mostly false or indeterminate 
would be via a form of error theory. Error theorists are suspicious of certain types or areas of 
discourse, and most famously of ethical discourse. An error theorist about ethical discourse 
is a cognitivist about ethical statements. The error theorist thinks that statements such as 
‘setting the cat on fire is cruel’ are (typically) assertions. They would agree with Davidson 
that the speaker is attributing the property ‘is cruel’ to the subject ‘setting the cat on fire’. 
(That is, they would honour what Williams calls the ‘surface phenomena’ of ethical 
statements). But the error theorist holds that such statements are systematically false or 
indeterminate due to the nature or source of the properties that are being attributed in 
these statements.  
The error theorist about ethical discourse does not think that all sentences which contain 
ethical concepts are false. Primarily the type of statement they are concerned with are those 
that imply or presuppose the instantiation of an ethical property. For example, while the 
statement ‘Pat thinks Patricia is unchaste’ is straightforwardly true or false depending on 
what Pat thinks, the truth value of the statement ‘Patricia is unchaste’ is regarded as being 
somewhat more problematic. The error theorist might claim that the properties in question 
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simply do not exist. This seems to be Mackie’s position (there is ‘really’ no such property as 
’chaste’ or ‘unchaste’ whether Pat thinks there is or not).  
We are left then with the following possibility: by itself, the claim that value judgments must 
possess some truth value (must be true, false or perhaps neither) in virtue of their logical or 
grammatical form appears to be compatible with the thought that the truth value of many 
ethical judgements, say, may be indeterminate or false. Halvard Lillehammer appears to 
have noticed this quite general point too. Lillehammer remarks that Davidson often explains 
his conception of the objectivity of evaluative judgements in terms of their possession of 
some truth-value, noting that so understood evaluative judgements could be regarded as 
having truth values ‘even if all evaluative claims were indeterminate or false’ (Lillehammer 
2007, 217). If Davidson wants to say something stronger than this, and he certainly does, 
then it is clear that he needs something more than these general arguments against non-
cognitivst approaches to ethical discourse. This is where the argument from interpretation, 
and the general presumption in favour of the truth and coherence of any thinker’s beliefs 
and attitudes that follows from it, seems to come in to Davidson’s account. 
Davidson has argued that not only are ethical judgements properly understood as being true 
or false, but also that many are true. He supports this view with a claim about how value 
judgements acquire content. He seems to appeal to the general presumption about the 
truth and coherence of beliefs and attitudes in this respect. But, I have argued, this alone is 
not enough to secure the claim that most ethical judgments must be true. In order for the 
general presumption to secure this claim, Davidson must show that ethical judgements, or 
beliefs about the ‘ethical properties’ of things, are included amongst the basic beliefs of any 
thinker. If Davidson can show this, then the error theory fails to get any grip on ethical 
properties and the judgments that predicate them. These judgements could not be mostly 
false, because their content would generally be determined by what causes them. But 
Davidson’s blanket ontology does not tell us anything about specifically ethical properties 
without this point. 
To summarise, the argument from interpretation is purported to show that the correct 
interpretation of a speaker’s language by an interpreter must result in a large degree of 
agreement about ontology, about the sorts of things that exist. But, as I claimed in Chapter 
2, we can’t get from any general claim about agreement on basic ontology to a specific claim 
about a core of agreement on what exists when we consider ethical properties without 
saying more than this. What he must say, I am claiming, is that it is a condition for being a 
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thinker (that is, a condition on mindedness as such) that thinkers have ethical beliefs 
amongst their basic beliefs. 
2. Error Theory, Primary Properties and Secondary Properties 
There are a cluster of questions which arise within accounts of value regarding the nature 
and source of value properties, such as: Do value properties really exist? Are they ‘in the 
world’? Do they exist independently of contingent human sensibilities? Are certain value 
properties natural or unnatural? At first glance, these questions might seem relevant to the 
idea that judgments about ethical properties could (must) figure amongst the basic 
perceptual beliefs of any thinker. Certainly, it would be odd if beliefs about contingent 
cultural or social properties were to be included amongst the basic beliefs which lead to 
‘constraints on mindedness as such’. 
Davidson however is quite spectacularly unconcerned with these questions. He thinks that 
we can address the question of whether or not value judgements can be intelligently 
regarded as true or false, and even show that many must be true, without settling questions 
of whether or not value properties are real or exist in the world, or whether or not they are 
independent of contingent human sensibilities. Davidson’s approach is to concentrate on 
what he calls the ‘epistemological problem’ of value judgements and let the ‘ontological 
problem’ take care of itself. To address the epistemological problem is to look at how the 
content of value judgments is determined. To address the ontological problem is to look at 
the nature and source of value properties. Davidson states that ‘if we were to solve the 
epistemological problem we would lose interest in the supposed ontological problem’ 
(Davidson 2004, 44).  
I think that Davidson’s views on this point must at least in part be down to his commitment 
to certain claims about the relationship between semantics and ontology which I mentioned 
in the previous chapter. Davidson’s account of how the content of value judgements is 
determined is essentially connected to his account of interpretation, which in turn supports 
his argument for general presumption of truth and coherence among the beliefs and 
attitudes of any thinker.33 One of the things that this account is supposed to show is that an 
interpreter and a speaker must agree to a large extent on matter of basic ontology. In 
Chapter 2 I claimed that we can’t get from any general claim about agreement on basic 
                                                 
33 ‘How do we tell what the content of a particular moral judgment is? This is a question of 
interpretation, of the understanding by one person of the utterances of another, since there is no 
other context in which the content of a judgment can be agreed to or disputed’ (Davidson 2004, 48). 
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ontology to a specific claim about a core of agreement on what exists when we consider 
ethical properties without saying more than this.  
If this is right, then it is my belief that the epistemological point that Davidson has made 
does not provide us with a good enough reason to lose interest in what might broadly be 
described as the ontological problems about value properties. In what follows I will focus on 
Davidson’s explicit remarks on these ontological problems – that is, on the issues that arise 
when we consider the nature and source of value properties. I will attempt to show how 
these problems might cast doubt on the idea that concern with ethical properties will 
provide constraints on mindedness as such. 
Davidson finds it strange to ask whether or not value properties exist, or whether they are 
‘in the world’. He remarks that while the entities and events to which we attribute value 
properties certainly exist or are ‘in the world’ (in most cases anyway), the ‘properties we 
predicate of such things are neither here nor there, for properties have no location’. He then 
states that he can happily agree with philosophers such as Richard Hare and Simon 
Blackburn when they claim that ‘it adds nothing to an account of values to insist that they 
are real, part of the furniture of the world, something waiting to be found or discovered’ 
(Davidson 2004, 45). 
In some ways this is a controversial claim. Many philosophers have thought it an extremely 
important issue whether or not value properties are in some sense ‘made’ or are ‘found’ or 
‘discovered’ in the world34. Davidson does not deny this. He remarks that discussions of 
value are almost always ‘infected’ by this issue. So why does Davidson make this 
controversial claim, and how does he support it? It is perhaps helpful to return to the error 
theorist.  
One way to for an error theorist to set up their argument is in terms of the distinction 
between primary and secondary properties. Primary properties are thought to be properties 
that are independent of any thinker, such as extension, solidity, number, and motion. These 
properties would be expected to feature in an account of the world provided by a completed 
physics. Secondary properties are thought to be properties that produce sensations in 
observers, such as colour, taste, smell or sound. These properties would not be expected to 
feature in an account of the world provided by a completed physics. The (very crude) idea 
seems to be that only primary properties ‘exist in the world’, and so only judgments which 
                                                 
34 An example of an important contemporary work which addresses this question directly is ‘Truth, 
Invention and the Meaning of Life’ by David Wiggins (Wiggins 1998, 139-184). 
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predicate primary properties of objects or entities can be properly regarded as being true or 
false.  
The error theorist then might set up his argument is like this (E1):  
1. It is a presupposition of ethical discourse that ethical properties exist ‘in the world’ 
in the same sense that primary properties exist ‘in the world’ – that is, that they 
would feature in an account of the world that would be provided by a completed 
physics. 
2. Ethical properties do not exist ‘in the world’ in the same sense that primary 
properties exist ‘in the world’ – that is, they would not feature in an account of the 
world that would be provided by a completed physics. 
Therefore 
3. Statements that attribute ethical properties to entities or events are systematically 
false. 
In so far then as we can take Davidson to engage with this type of argument, we can take 
him to cast doubt on the first premise of the argument. That is to say that we can take 
Davidson to deny that a specific fact about ethical properties – that they are not primary 
properties – would be sufficient for the claim that they do not exist, or that we cannot make 
objective judgements regarding them. 
It is to this end it seems that Davidson discusses what are often referred to as ‘companions 
in innocence’ in this context, though Davidson does not use this term. That is to say that he 
discusses value properties in connection with secondary properties. In one place, Davidson 
notes that plenty of secondary properties (colour properties, such as the property of ‘being 
green’, are paradigm examples) are supervenient on the more fundamental properties of 
things35, without this counting against the objectivity of attributions of these properties to 
entities or events that are certainly in the world, or the truth or falsity of those attributions. 
Value properties and secondary properties such as colour properties might not be definable 
in purely physical terms, but it is still true that some things are green (and that most are not) 
                                                 
35 When I say that certain properties are superveneint on more fundamental properties I typically 
mean something along the following lines: a property or set of properties A is supervenient on 
another property or set of properties B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-
properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. There are, of course, subtly 
different ways of understanding the supervenience relation.  
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and that some entities or events have certain value properties, are cruel or fair, and others 
do not, and it is still true that some actions are courageous etc. and that others are not.   
I have claimed that Davidson needs to show that ethical properties are suitable candidates 
for featuring in basic propositional attitudes. The suggestion here is that (so far) there is 
nothing in the distinction between primary and secondary properties that might reasonably 
cast doubt on this.  Certainly it seems to be far too simplistic to say that value properties ‘do 
not exist’ or ‘are not real’ (that is, to generate the sort of worry that the error theorist at E1 
has in mind) on the basis they are not primary properties36. As John McDowell among others 
has repeatedly stressed, and Davidson would agree, the contrast between primary and 
secondary properties is not a contrast between the real and the unreal, or between the 
veridical and the illusory (cf. McDowell 1998, 136). Indeed, the very suggestion that value 
properties might need to be like primary properties has looked to many philosophers to be 
very odd. Susan Hurley describes this thought as ‘insane’.  
It is I think worth dwelling a little on why people might think this, in order to better 
understand the motivations behind those who have been tempted by this type of error 
theory. Primary properties, and the causal theories that can be constructed from them, can 
achieve a certain standard of truth and objectivity. There is an understanding of the term 
‘realist’ in which someone is said to be a realist with respect to a property or concept in so 
far as they believe that it would feature in some ideal causal theory37. Such theories have 
certain standards of proof. Particle physicists, for example, use the ‘five-sigma’ threshold of 
certainty, though researchers in other fields can claim a significant finding with just two or 
three-sigma threshold38. People then feel uncomfortable trying to impose ethical views on 
others once they begin to be aware that ethical propositions are not realist in this sense.39  
                                                 
36 I take it that Bernard Williams is making essentially the same point, with his usual clarity, in the 
following passage: ‘The fabric of the world from which the secondary qualities are absent is the world 
of primary qualities, and (to take for granted the answers to several large and contentious questions) 
the claim that secondary qualities, as presented, are not part of that world comes to much the same 
as the claim that they do not figure in an ‘absolute conception’ of the world on which scientific 
investigators, abstracting as much as possible from their various perceptual peculiarities, might 
converge. There is nothing unnerving or subversive about the idea that ethical qualities are not part 
of the fabric of the world in this sense’ (Williams 1995, 177). 
37 As Hurley notes, in this sense Mackie was an anti-realist in that he held that ethical concepts would 
not feature in such theories. 
38 The ‘five-sigma’ threshold corresponds to a p-value, or probability of error, of 3×10-7, or about 1 in 
3.5 million. 
39 There are I think interesting connections between this point and things that Williams says about 
ethical authority. 
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In fact it seems to me that this understanding of the term ‘realism’, which might more 
usefully be called ‘scientific realism’, is quite common. Furthermore it should not be 
particularly surprising, given the prevalence and prestige of the scientific standard of truth 
and objectivity in modern societies, that it has managed to permeate the everyday concepts 
of truth and objectivity in these societies to some degree. Value judgements or propositions 
perhaps lack truth or objectivity in this strict ‘scientific realist’ sense. However, if one wants 
to preserve the idea that there can be real truths about colour, about art, courage, twinges 
of pain or national sentiments, then one must allow that whether or not value properties are 
properly considered as primary properties or secondary properties does not necessarily 
affect the truth or objectivity of our attributions of these properties to entities or events 
that are certainly in the world. 
It might however be thought that there is some tension between Davidson’s ambivalence 
towards questions about the nature and status of value properties, and his remarks about 
causation. As I have previously noted, Davidson held that what makes any thinker’s 
judgements of the descriptive properties of entities or events true or false ‘is that the same 
properties tend to cause the same beliefs in different observers’, and he is quite clear that 
he thinks the same holds for value judgments. 
In one place he says: ‘Red objects tend to cause us to believe the objects are red, square 
objects tend to cause us to believe the objects are square, and precious objects tend to 
cause us to prize them. It is because the objects and events have the properties they do that 
they cause us to have the attitudes we do’ (Davidson 2004, 47). So, we might think, 
Davidson would say that it is the cruelty of objects (or more typically actions) that tends to 
cause us to believe that those objects are cruel. 
Secondary properties then, and it seems ethical properties, can for Davidson figure in causal 
explanations. It is not yet clear how far this claim threatens to embroil Davidson directly in 
the sort of debates about the status or nature of ethical properties that he appears to want 
to sidestep. That is, he would need to explain how ethical properties can figure in causal 
explanations, but without admitting them into the ideal causal theories which consist of 
primary properties. It is certainly not straightforward how he would accomplish this.  
Davidson would perhaps turn to his thesis of anomalous monism by way of explanation here 
(cf. Davidson 2001b). It is worth noting however that if Davidson’s claims about ethical 
judgements depend on this thesis then many would regard them as being undermined by 
that fact. It has been argued that for certain properties, for example ethical properties, to 
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figure in causal explanations, causal relations between entities or events need to hold in 
virtue of the entity or events possessing these properties. It is not clear however how these 
relations can hold in virtue of the entity or event possessing the ethical properties, if the fact 
that entity or event possesses certain physical properties--which are ipso facto not ethical 
properties--is sufficient to ensure that the relations hold. The last point follows from claim 
the thesis known as the causal completeness of the physical. This thesis is widely held, and it 
can seem that Davidson must either deny that thesis, or reject this requirement on what it is 
for properties to figure in causal explanations.   
I am willing to grant however that in some sense thinkers may be understood to stand in 
causal relations to various ethical properties (‘it was the cruelty of the action which caused 
my belief that…’) while denying that Davidson has shown that the beliefs caused by such 
relations should be included amongst the ‘basic beliefs’ of any speaker, or that concern with 
such properties is a ‘condition of mindedness as such’.  
3. Error Theory and Response-Dependence 
There is another way that the error theoretic position might be construed. Rather than 
worrying about the fact that value properties do not feature in our ideal causal theories of 
the world, that they are not primary properties, there is a particular feature of secondary 
properties that many have found problematic when the analogy with value properties is 
made. This is the apparent ‘response-dependence’ of secondary properties. Indeed the 
distinction between primary and secondary properties is sometimes drawn explicitly in 
terms of the response-dependence of secondary properties.  
McDowell, for example, has suggested that we often distinguish between the two types of 
property in the following sense: A property is a primary property only if what it is for an 
entity or event to have the property can be understood without reference to subjective 
states. In contrast, a property is a secondary property only if what it is for an entity or event 
to have the property cannot adequately be understood without reference to subjective 
states (cf. McDowell 1985). Secondary properties and, if we persist with the analogy, value 
properties, are understood to be response-dependent then in that the properties in 
question can only be explained with reference to the reactions of human subjects.  
It is not in fact a simple task to characterise the exact nature of the response dependence of 
secondary properties, or ethical properties. However, the general worry in this area seems 
to be this: It seems plausible that secondary properties are relative to human responses in 
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the following way. If human beings were to evolve (or simply change) so that everything in 
the world that had appeared brown came to appear red, this is, according to one way of 
thinking, simply what it would be for the world to cease to contain brown things and come 
to contain only red things.  Similar claims could be made about the human capacity to 
distinguish certain tastes or the ability to hear certain sounds. In contrast, it is highly 
intuitive to many people that if human beings were to evolve so that they stopped 
classifying a set of actions as ‘cruel’, this is not what it would be for the world to cease to 
contain ‘cruel’ actions40. The challenge is to show why the response-dependence has the 
consequences it does in the colour case but not in the value case.  
I suspect that one of the primary motivations of those writers who have insisted that value 
properties ‘exist in the world’ has been to attempt to rule out the idea that value properties 
are response-dependent in any way that allows this worry to get a grip. That is, to insist that 
ethical properties are in some important sense ‘response-independent’. Another way to set 
up the error theorist’s argument then might be like this (E2):  
1. It is a presupposition of ethical discourse that ethical properties are response-
independent. 
2. Ethical properties are not response independent. 
Therefore: 
3. Ethical statements which attribute ethical properties to entities or events are 
systematically false. 
Now there is a response to this sort of argument which I think Davidson should take but 
which he doesn’t take, or at least doesn’t appear to take seriously. This is to accept, with the 
likes of McDowell and David Wiggins, that there is a variety of response-dependence which 
ethical properties share with other secondary properties, but insist that this does not make 
ethical judgements any less capable of being objectively true or false. Both McDowell and 
Wiggins suggest that ethical properties are in some sense contingent on the responses of 
                                                 
40 Cf. Blackburn, in Honderich ed. 1985, 14: ‘If we were to change so that everything in the world 
which had appeared blue came to appear red to us, this is what it would be for the world to cease to 
contain red things. The analogue with moral qualities fails dramatically: if everyone comes to think of 
it as permissible to maltreat animals, this does nothing at all to make it permissible, it just means that 
everybody has deteriorated’. Blackburn in fact seems to take this to be so obvious that he does not 
argue for it. 
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agents, but unlike the error theorist of E2 they do not think that this brings the reality or 
objectivity of ethical properties into question. 
Again the approach against the error theorist here at E2 would be to cast doubt on the first 
premise of the argument, and again one approach might be to find companions in innocence 
– to point out that secondary properties like colours, properly understood, are also 
conceptually tied to how they are perceived by human agents (are ‘essentially subjective’ as 
Wiggins sometimes puts it), and yet such properties are rightly thought of as capable of 
being attributed to entities or events objectively. That is, judgements that predicate such 
properties of objects are capable of being true or false.41 
McDowell, for example, has again often used the colour analogy to make his point. He has 
argued that: ‘An object’s being such as to look red is independent of its actually looking red 
to anyone on any particular occasion; so, notwithstanding the conceptual connection 
between being red and being experienced as red, the experience of something as being red 
can count as being presented with a property that is there anyway – independently of the 
experience itself’ (McDowell 1998, 134).   
But it is important to note that McDowell at least it seems is not simply denying the 
plausibility of the first premise of E2, he is denying the plausibility of the claim about red and 
brown that allowed the general worry raised above to get going. That is, for McDowell there 
is an important sense in which the world, in this scenario, would not cease to contain ‘red’ 
things.  
According to McDowell’s account, even if human beings lose the capacity to experience ‘red’ 
things, this would not mean that red things had ceased to exist. Human beings without that 
capacity are defective.  This is consistent with the theory of response-dependence, for when 
McDowell says that what it is for something to be red is for it to be such as to look red to 
human beings, he means for it to be such as to look red to non-defective human beings. 
Similarly, in the case of ‘cruel’, McDowell would say that for action A to be cruel is for it to 
be such as to merit certain subjective responses amongst non-defective human beings. This 
would ensure that, even if we were somehow to lose the capacity for such responses, this 
would not falsify the claim that action A is cruel.  
                                                 
41 It is worth noting at this point that the same would also be true of what might more obviously be 
regarded as ‘social properties’, things like ‘money’, ‘contract’, ‘marriage’ etc. 
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I suspect that Davidson would have taken a similar line to McDowell on this issue (‘red’ 
objects would exist and ‘cruel’ objects would exist even it human beings lost the capacity to 
respond to them) but does not say enough in this context for me to be sure about this. 
Taking this sort of line however raises a number of thorny issues, and requires a substantial 
amount of further argumentation. More specifically, there are a host of issues which 
surround the notion of ‘merit’ which is being invoked, and around the notions of ‘defective’ 
and ‘non-defective’ human beings which are being invoked. Saying so little here simply does 
not help Davidson’s case. If he does not think that he is at risk of getting embroiled in these 
issues, he needs to say considerably more about why this is so.  
Davidson seems to think that the very question of whether or not value properties are 
contingent on the existence of human sensibilities or sense organs is a bad one. I find his 
general ambivalence in this area unsatisfying. At one point Davidson chides Wiggins for 
saying that the property of ‘being red’ is in an interesting sense a relative property as colour 
is a category that ‘corresponds to an interest that can only take root in creatures with 
something approaching our own sensory apparatus’ by remarking that ‘in this sense all 
perspectival properties are relative’ (Davidson 2004, 47). One wants to say that of course all 
perceptual properties are relative in this sense, but there are distinctions amongst these 
properties that are important and interesting. In what follows I will discuss one such 
distinction, and try and say something about why I think it is important in an ethical context.  
3. Explanatory Differences 
Bernard Williams has argued influentially that the analogy between secondary properties 
and value properties breaks down in an important way. Williams argues that our 
explanations of secondary properties can and do in fact relate the way the world seems to 
us (or what is ‘there to be experienced’) to the way the world is according to physics 
(according to our best understanding of primary properties). He claims that our conception 
of secondary properties rests on the notion that in principle the perception of (say) colours 
can be explained in terms of perceptual psychology, on the one hand, and the world as 
characterised by primary properties, on the other (cf. Williams 1995, 177).  
The idea is that the explanations of our experiences of secondary properties can show how 
they are related to physical reality, and how they can lead to knowledge of that reality. As he 
put the point some years earlier, ‘the psychological capacities that underlie our perceiving 
the world in terms of secondary properties have evolved so that the physical world presents 
itself in reliable ways’ (Williams 1985, 150). 
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Williams suggests that this is simply not the case when we reflect on value properties42. 
There is nothing in our understanding of a thinker’s ethical values (‘what they think 
important, laudable, hateful, to be condemned or despised and so forth in the actions and 
reactions of human beings’) which could correspond to the scientific explanations we have 
of our perception of secondary qualities, explanations which relate the way the world is to 
the way the world seems to us. When we consider the relation between value properties 
and the world, any explanation will not look at all like an explanation of colour properties. 
This is because the concepts and standards that our explanations invoke are those involved 
in finding our way around not simply the physical world (the world of primary properties) 
but also a social world, where this means one social world among many. Williams thinks that 
an ethical life, and ethical thinking, is in part essentially local; its characteristic concepts are 
not intelligible independently of particular cultural perspectives. So, when we explain the 
relation between ethical properties and the world, the world must already be construed in a 
‘psychologically and socially richer sense’ than the world of primary properties (cf. Williams 
1995, 177). Consider a particular thick value concept that some people are disposed to use, 
the concept of blasphemy. Whether or not an action or utterance is counted as 
‘blasphemous’ (whether or not the concept ‘blasphemous’ is correctly applied) must seem 
to the radical interpreter to depend as much on the social or cultural environment of the 
speaker as it does on the state of the physical surroundings. (This problem exists whether or 
not we allow that a thinker can stand in a causal relation to a property, ‘blasphemous’.) 
The point is not simply that primary properties underdetermine the ethical properties of 
different social worlds. It seems simply true, independent of any considerations about social 
worlds, that primary properties underdetermine evaluative properties. Williams’s point is 
that ethical properties seem to lack even the clear relation to explanatorily primary 
properties that other secondary properties have. In this sense they seem to have something 
in common with ‘social concepts’.43 This matters when we try to explain differences 
between thinkers on ethical matters, when we try to explain ‘why things are like this for 
them and not for us’. This particular point, I think, also casts doubt on the idea that ethical 
                                                 
42 Davidson would claim that some ethical judgements are amongst the basic perceptual judgments of 
any thinker. But he would still need to show how the perception of ethical properties could be 
explained by perceptual psychology and the world characterised by primary properties in order to 
address the point made by Williams. 
43 Of course, the claim that ethical properties resemble ‘social properties’ in this way is controversial. 
Nothing I say against Davidson here hangs on the idea that ethical properties resemble social 
properties in any strong sense. The case against Davidson, or at least the main case, against turns, 
specifically, on worries about whether ethical properties can be akin to secondary qualities. 
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properties are likely candidates for featuring amongst the basic propositional attitudes of 
any thinker, that substantial ethical concerns provide ‘constraints on mindedness as such’. It 
seems plausible that a property that figures in a basic belief cannot be a property that 
objects instantiate only if relevant people think that objects instantiate, i.e. can’t be a social 
property like money or marriage. This is because the concepts that figure in basic perceptual 
beliefs do not seem to be like concepts such as marriage or money, because what they are 
concepts of—that is primary and secondary properties – do not seem to be response-
dependent in the same way that social properties such as being married, and being a 
medium of exchange, are.   
I have been attempting to argue towards a claim along the following lines. In order for 
Davidson’s position to be plausible, he would need to deny that ethical properties could 
have the status of primary properties. Further, Davidson needs to treat ethical properties as 
having the status of secondary properties and acknowledge that they have a degree of 
response dependence. The issue is how they can have this status, given the disanalogy 
between ethical properties and other secondary properties that Williams has raised. Not all 
secondary properties are the same, and we might think that there are significant difficulties 
between ethical properties and other types of secondary properties. Of course, that some 
ethical properties are problematic does not mean that all are. 
One significant issue in this area (a more significant issue) is connected to the thought that 
Davidson would clearly not want to claim that any response-dependent property could be 
regarded as a real property (or a natural property) that could be objectively attributed to 
any entity or event. What it is for an entity or event to have a value property requires, on 
McDowell’s account, that the property is ‘there to be experienced, as opposed to being a 
mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience of it’ (McDowell 
1998, 134). I think most people would want to say at least this about ethical properties. This 
raises the question of how we can distinguish between properties that are ‘there to be 
experienced’ and properties that are ‘mere figments of our subjective states’. It seems 
difficult to address this question without making broadly ontological distinctions. (We want 
to say here: because that property is there to be experienced, while that property is a mere 
figment of a subjective state.)  
The typical example of properties that are thought to be ‘mere figments of our subjective 
states’ would be those that thinkers experience during hallucinations. However, in ethical 
disputes it has often been thought very important that we are able to affirm or deny that 
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properties such as ‘being a Kraut’ or ‘being chaste’ (or simply ‘cruel’) are ‘there to be 
experienced’. It is here that we encounter the type of disagreement that was referred to in 
Chapter 1, namely the sort of disagreement that can occur between those who do use a 
certain ethical concept and those who don’t. This is an ethically important type of 
disagreement, and it is a disagreement about what exists.  
There is a sense in which Davidson’s type of argument, an a priori argument from 
interpretation, appears to be peculiarly impotent in this context. Davidson in fact 
acknowledges a specific problem here about drawing ontological consequences from 
semantics. He says: ‘In describing the semantics, and hence the ontology, of a language we 
must perforce appeal to the entities we think exist. But these are just the entities that 
belong to the ontology of our own language; there is no way we can progress beyond our 
own resources by doing semantics’ (Davidson 2005, 41). 
In light of these remarks, we might consider a case described by Williams (cf. Williams 1995, 
185). Williams asks us to imagine ‘a people who are filled with terror, perhaps of a rather 
special, numinous kind, by certain features of their environment. They have a word that 
picks out things to which they react in this way. It is not a blankly causal, still less a merely 
individual reaction, and children are instructed in what does and does not merit it’. 
According to Williams, an interpreter could conceivably come to understand these reactions, 
and the word that picks out certain entities or events in terms of this reaction. The 
interpreter would not need to share the reaction, except to the extent that he would need 
to imaginatively enter into the speaker’s view of things: he would not need to share ‘the 
beliefs and attitudes which make this reaction intelligible’. Williams then asks: Is the 
property for which they have this term ‘there to be perceived’? It is part of the speaker’s 
world; it is not part of the interpreter’s world. Is it part of the world? If general 
considerations about interpretation can tell us nothing about this case, and this case raises 
issues about ethical objectivity, then general considerations about interpretation cannot 
settle the issues of ethical objectivity to the extent that Davidson sometimes seems to 
suggest. That is to say Davidson’s blanketing remarks about the necessary agreement on 
basic ontology that is required for interpretation to be possible seem to be of little help 
here. Of course most of the properties that we predicate of objects and events there to be 
experienced. But in this type of case we are after specifics.  
I think that someone like McDowell would say that some ethical properties are there to be 
experienced, but can perhaps only be experienced if the thinker has the appropriate 
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upbringing or moral education etc. But I am sceptical as to whether this sort of neo-
Aristotelian account could actually help Davidson, for the following reason. If concern with 
certain ethical concepts is connected to contingent facts about upbringing, then it is hard to 
see how a concern with such concepts could represent a constraint on mindedness as such. 
That is, if concern with certain ethical properties is only understood with reference to 
contingent facts about upbringing, then this is perhaps further evidence that such properties 
may correctly be understood as social properties, or properties of specific social worlds. And 
again, a property that figures in a basic belief, we might think, cannot be a property that 
objects instantiate only if relevant people think that objects instantiate.  
Of course, any thinker must have some sort of upbringing, must have been brought up into 
some linguistic culture. The worry must be that having certain ethical beliefs requires some 
sort of upbringing over and above this one. Davidson could say, very plausibly, that any 
thinker must have some ethical beliefs, but there may be specific ethical concepts (such as 
piety) which require more particular kinds of upbringing. Whether this is all Davidson needs 
to say to secure the substantial ethical conclusions that he attempts to draw from his 
account of interpretation is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
4. Summary 
I have argued that in order to grant Davidson’s general presumption we must accept that 
there are a class of ‘basic beliefs’ which must have some true instances because their 
content is determined by what causes them. Further, in order to make substantial claims 
about ethical judgments on the basis of this general presumption, it needs to be shown that 
ethical properties are such that they can feature amongst basic beliefs. I have suggested 
however that the nature of ethical properties should make us wary of this idea. More 
specifically, my case against Davidson turns on worries about whether ethical properties can 
be akin to secondary qualities. I have argued that Davidson has not addressed this issue in 
enough detail. Indeed, one criticism that I have made of Davidson is that he has not set out 
the nature and extent of his ethical claims in general in enough detail for us to be sure of 
their full implications.  
Susan Hurley, in her excellent book ‘Natural Reasons’ (Hurley 1989), argues from 
Davidsonian considerations about interpretation and charity to robust claims about ethical 
objectivity. Hurley argues more specifically that any attribution by an interpreter of desires 
and preferences to a speaker is inextricable from the attribution of some ethical values. That 
is to say that, according to Hurley, an interpreter would not be in a position to recognise a 
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speaker’s basic desires or preferences, and so the formal values of coherence and 
consistency that they exhibit, unless they shared with the speaker certain substantive 
evaluative and, according to Hurley, recognisably ethical interests and concerns. 
I will discuss Hurley’s central argument in Chapter 4. I suggest that there are two broad 
approaches that such an argument could take. The first approach would not identify any 
particular set of ethical concepts or properties concern with which is required for a 
successful interpretation, but rather will state that there simply needs to be enough material 
to make the identification—without a specification of what that material will necessarily be. 
The second approach would attempt to identify some determinate set of ethical properties 
as central, that a human being must be concerned with in order to be regarded as a human 
being. Anything that lacks concern with these ethical properties would not be a human 
being, therefore anything that is properly interpreted as a human is concerned with these 
ethical properties. I suggest that either approach faces at least one substantial obstacle.  
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Chapter 4: Shared Values 
Davidson has often referred to the idea that any two speakers must share ‘a range of basic 
values’ in order for them to be mutually intelligible. It is clear that this much is thought to 
follow from Davidson’s account of radical interpretation. One idea which he emphasises in 
more than one place is that whether an interpreter is trying to understand the evaluative 
attitudes or the evaluative judgements of a speaker, ‘everything depends on our ability to 
find common ground’, and this common ground ‘is not subsequent to understanding but a 
condition of it’ (cf. Davidson 2004, 37, 51).  
I have been looking at how Davidson might attempt to get from claims about radical 
interpretation to substantial claims about ethics. One criticism that I have made of Davidson 
is that he hasn’t set out the full nature and extent of his ethical claims in enough detail for us 
to be sure of their full implications. In this chapter I will consider what I regard as a 
development of Davidson’s approach that can be found in the work of Susan Hurley. I will 
then look at the more specific question of whether or not the argument from interpretation 
that Hurley presents could show that all speakers, as Bernard Williams has put it, must share 
in some more or less determinate form ‘the same materials of an ethical life’ (Williams 1995, 
141). I conclude by suggesting that the sort of problems I raise for Hurley can be shown to be 
problems for the approach more generally.   
1. Basic Values: 
Firstly, I am looking to shed some light the following question: what, if any, substantial 
ethical conclusions might we hope to establish from the common ground of basic values that 
are required for interpretation according to the argument from interpretation? In order to 
answer this question I will need to say a bit more about what might be meant by the 
‘common ground of basic values’. 
Perhaps I should start with some very obvious points. Whatever an answer to this question 
will look like, it must be compatible with the nature and existence of de facto disagreement 
on matters of value. Davidson does not think that all speakers in fact agree on all matters of 
value, or even that they would agree if they could just understand each other44. 
                                                 
44 In one place Davidson does say that we should expect ‘enlightened values’ of speakers who fully 
understand each other to converge (Davidson 2004, 49). By enlightened values he means ‘the reasons 
we have for valuing when we have all the non-evaluative facts straight’. What exactly is meant to 
follow from these remarks is a little unclear. It would be very odd however, and out of line with 
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In one place Davidson says: ‘Just as in coming to the best understanding of your beliefs I 
must find you coherent and correct, so I must match your values and mine: not of course in 
all matters, but in enough to give point to the differences. This is not to pretend or assume 
that we all agree…The only way of knowing what someone else’s values are is one that 
builds on a common framework’ (Davidson 2004, 36). Successful interpretation then should 
not be expected to eliminate all disagreement on all matters of value. This would be absurd. 
The thought is that successful interpretation makes meaningful disagreement possible, and 
that this depends on some foundation of agreement.  
Davidson acknowledges that the different languages that speakers use allow them to 
express strikingly different ways of thinking. He acknowledges that there can be real 
differences in evaluative norms amongst speakers who understand each other, again as long 
as those differences are placed within a common framework. He also acknowledges that 
interpreters must allow for the fact that some values are further removed from the values 
the attribution of which is necessary to make minimally coherent sense of others. The 
thought seems to be that there are some ‘basic’ values which are constitutive of rational 
agency, and which presumably can be contrasted with other ‘non-basic’ values.45 These 
basic values provide constraints on the eligibility of interpretations. How then might we 
draw the distinction between the basic values that all speakers must share and the other 
non-basic values? It is I think fair to say that the nature and extent of the distinction is not 
always particularly clear in Davidson’s work. Indeed, the sometimes vague formulations of 
the principle of charity that were highlighted in Chapter 1 seem to be particularly 
problematic in the context of Davidson’s remarks about values. 
Hallvard Lillehammer has suggested that basic values are essentially to be understood as 
‘core values, as opposed to peripheral values, within a holistic network of values and beliefs’ 
(Lillehammer 2007, 211). Lillehammer adds that while none of these values (or indeed 
beliefs) are to be regarded as analytically immune from revision, some will be more central 
to interpretation than others’. I think that this is right as far as it goes but that it doesn’t go 
very far.  
                                                 
anything that Davidson says elsewhere, to take them as implying that all such values would converge 
absolutely and in all cases.  
45 I am not suggesting that we should expect a clean distinction in every case. In one place Davidson 
remarks that ‘the more basic a norm is to our making sense of an agent, the less content we can give 
to the idea that we disagree with respect to that norm’ (Davidson 2004, 50). This is suggestive of a 
sliding scale. 
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In the same paper Lillehammer does remark, and with some justification, that whenever 
Davidson distinguishes between basic values (or ‘structurally important’ values) and non-
basic values, he tends to ‘illustrate the former by mentioning the paradigmatically formal 
values of consistency and coherence’ that regulate the attribution of desires and 
preferences to the speaker. Davidson certainly thinks that certain formal evaluative 
constraints on intelligibility are constitutive of agency, and the discussion of these formal 
constraints is prominent in his work. For example, in one place he says that ‘the constraints 
that a Bayesian theory of preference places on the pattern of beliefs and evaluations exert a 
prima facie claim on interpretation; consistency of preferences with one another and with 
beliefs is a constitutive pressure on interpretation simply because we cannot rationalise (i.e. 
explain or understand) deviations from it’ (Davidson 2004, 71). We can contrast this with 
Davidson explicitly stating that, for example, conceptions of justice and fairness have ‘no 
favoured role’ in our attributions of propositional attitudes to others (Davidson 2004, 74). 
It might seem then that there is some textual support for attributing to Davidson the 
following view: while the more formal values of coherence and logical consistency are the 
basic values that are constitutive of rational agency, more substantial values (or more 
specifically ethical values such as a concern for liberty, justice or fairness) are non-basic and 
play no role in interpretation. If this were so, we might perhaps expect the extent and 
nature of the shared values required for interpretation to leave substantial ethical matters 
pretty much untouched. Of course, to say that conceptions of justice and fairness ‘play no 
favoured role’ in interpretation is not to say that concern for justice or liberty plays no role 
at all. In fact however I think that this later claim would be in line with a fairly common way 
of reading Davidson, which takes basic values to be essentially the formal values of 
consistency and coherence, and pays less attention to the role that substantial values might 
play in interpretation. 
On this reading it might look like a mistake to think that substantial ethical conclusions could 
be derived from the consideration of radical interpretation. This however would leave 
Davidson’s explicit claims about ethics looking strangely weak. I take it that Davidson must 
want to say, and indeed does say, more than this. I take it that he wants to say, at least, that 
consideration of radical interpretation can lead us to the conclusion that ethical judgments 
are objectively true or false, and that there is more and deeper agreement on them than 
there may often seem to be.  
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Susan Hurley has argued that there are good reasons for not construing the distinction 
between basic and non-basic values in the way that I have just sketched, that is, as a 
distinction between formal and substantive values. These reasons stem from the idea, 
articulated powerfully by Hurley in work that draws heavily on Davidson’s own, that an 
interpreter would not be in a position to recognise a speaker’s basic desires or preferences, 
and so the formal values of coherence and consistency that they exhibit, unless they shared 
with the speaker certain substantive evaluative and, according to Hurley, recognisably 
ethical interests and concerns46. That is to say that, according to Hurley, the basic values two 
speakers must share in order to be mutually intelligible must provide substantive and in part 
ethical constraints as well as formal constraints on interpretation.  
2. Hurley’s Argument from Interpretation: 
In his later work on radical interpretation Davidson increasingly emphasised the relationship 
between the theory of interpretation and formal decision theory. In one essay he in fact 
suggests altering the evidential basis of radical interpretation from sentences held true by 
the speaker to sentences preferred true by the speaker (cf. Davidson 2004, 13-34). The 
ethical implications of this were never fully explored in Davidson’s own work.  
However, the nature of the relationship between the theory of interpretation, formal 
decision theory, and ethics is explored in detail by Hurley in her book ‘Natural Reasons’ 
(Hurley 1989). One thesis that Hurley argues for in this remarkable and sadly neglected book 
is that any attribution of desires and preferences to a speaker is inextricable from the 
attribution of some ethical values. This may in fact be a thought that finds fleeting 
expression in Davidson’s work, though it is certainly never argued in as much detail as it is in 
Hurley’s work.  
According to Hurley, any interpreter must attribute substantive and recognisably ethical 
evaluative interests (values?) to a speaker even in the course of crediting them with basic 
desires and preferences.  This is because it is only by reference to some sense of the 
speaker’s substantive and ethical values, to what the speaker thinks important and 
worthwhile, that an interpreter could give content to those desires and preferences. The 
following thought is that the speaker’s values must be values that the interpreter could 
                                                 
46 I am following Hurley by using ‘substantive’ simply to mean ‘concerning issues of substance and 
content rather than form, procedure and consistency’ (Hurley 1989, 389). 
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share, or at least make sense to the interpreter as values that a speaker qua speaker could 
have.  
Hurley’s argument stems from a claim about decision theory. Davidson has famously 
suggested that the structural constraints on preferences invoked by the likes of Frank 
Ramsey and Richard Jeffery in their work on decision theory could be employed in radical 
interpretation. But as Hurley puts it, and as Davidson himself clearly recognised47, decision 
theory does not interpret itself. Hurley argues that a decision theorist (and so, for her 
purposes and ours, an interpreter) must at least tacitly recognise ‘a variety of naturalistic 
and social substantive constraints on desires and preferences, in addition to formal 
principles of rational coherence’ (Hurley 1989, 98). Hurley brings out this point by discussing 
what she calls, following David Lewis, ‘the problem of eligibility of interpretations’. I will 
briefly set out the problem and Hurley’s response. The problem is best illustrated by way of 
examples. Here is a very simple manifestation of the problem that Hurley herself discusses.  
It is generally held that the transitivity of preference is a fundamental axiom of decision 
theory. If we encounter a speaker who prefers pears to oranges and oranges to apples, then 
we may assume that the speaker does not (or at least should not) prefer apples to pears. 
The thought is that this axiom helps us attribute content to the thoughts and utterances of 
others. But suppose in fact the speaker goes on to exhibit various preferences which seem 
to be intransitive. Has the axiom been discredited? Not necessarily, as Hurley explains. A 
defender of the axiom could suggest that the original account of the speaker’s preferences 
was simply incorrect. Perhaps the speaker prefers pears to oranges and oranges to red 
apples, but prefers green apples above all.  Or perhaps the speaker only prefers pears with 
leaves on to oranges. If the pear has no leaves on it he is indifferent between pears and 
oranges. Or perhaps the speaker has just changed his mind. He preferred pears to oranges at 
t, but not at t1.  
The manoeuvre in each case is to suggest more finely individuated alternatives or 
preferences in order to satisfy the axiom. At some point however, as Hurley points out, we 
will baulk at this sort of reinterpretation. At some point we will cross the line between 
interpretations of the preferences of the speaker which we regard as eligible and those 
                                                 
47 Cf. Davidson 2001b, 147: ‘A radical theory of decision must include a theory of interpretation and 
cannot presuppose it’. For Davidson on the specific problems of using decision theory in the process 
of radical interpretation, cf. Davidson 2004, 29-34. The problem I discuss here applies to decision 
theory more generally. Hurley refers approvingly Tversky’s suggestion that ‘decision theorists are 
eager to tell people how to act, in light of their values. They are typically reluctant to tell them how to 
feel or what to value’ (Hurley 1989, 105). 
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which we regard as in ineligible. Further, the possibility of our being able to refute or 
confirm the axiom at all depends on this distinction48.  
This worry is linked to a more general worry about interpretation, the thought that every 
interpretation is subject to further interpretation. The general idea that is supposed to stop 
this worry from getting a grip, both in Davidson and in Hurley, is that the interpreter must 
recognise constitutive constraints on interpretation, provided in part by what Hurley refers 
to as ‘the normal relations of the mind to the world’ (Hurley 1989, 84). It is only in virtue of 
these constraints that mental states have the contents they have, or could have determinate 
content at all. The specific idea here is that in order to judge whether the speaker’s 
preferences are consistent or inconsistent, the interpreter needs to be able to distinguish 
between eligible and ineligible interpretations of the speaker’s actions, and so distinguish 
between eligible and ineligible contents of the speaker’s preferences that these actions 
express. Perhaps there are strict and determinate rules for the distinction between eligible 
and ineligible constraints in every case.  
However, according to Hurley any distinction between eligible and ineligible constraints on 
preferences requires substantive and recognisably ethical constraints as well as formal 
constraints on the contents of those preferences. According to Hurley, there is simply ‘no 
good reason for excluding from the class of distinctions that respect constraints on eligibility 
those provided by applications of evaluative or reason giving concepts to the alternatives 
the agent faces’ (1989, 99).49  
I have previously spoken at some length of the way that the principle of correspondence 
emphasises the significance of the causal connections that link the interpreter, the speaker, 
and the shared world. According to Hurley, as well as being interested in these causal 
connections, thinkers are interested in ‘making sense of themselves and one another, in 
trying to find one another intelligible. Applications of reason giving and evaluative concepts 
make an essential contribution to the kind of intelligibility and understanding that we seek 
as persons…To eschew the use of these concepts…would be to frustrate this interest, and 
                                                 
48 According to Hurley the point applies to both descriptive and normative theories of decision. She 
says: ‘a descriptive theory should be refutable, or it will lack empirical content, and a normative 
theory should be possible to violate, otherwise it will provide no constraints on action at all’ (Hurley 
1989, 59).  
49 Earlier, Hurley speaks of the ‘need to distinguish between characterisations of alternatives or states 
of affairs that are intelligibly related to values and human goods, thus potentially reason giving, and 
characterisations which are none of these things’ (Hurley 1989, 87). 
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distort the attitudes to be understood, which are constitutively informed by this interest’ 
(Hurley 1989, 100).50  
I take it that the general direction of the above remarks is as follows. Something more than 
just formal constraints is required to distinguish between eligible and ineligible 
interpretations of the contents of the speaker’s preferences. What is required, according to 
Hurley, can be regarded as some sort of understanding of what might be called a thinker’s 
ethical nature.  According to Hurley, any such understanding of ethical nature must allow 
‘determinations on eligibility with respect to…preferences to be sensitive to distinctions that 
it is normal and natural to recognise or care about, in the context of familiar reason giving 
practices and forms of life, or which have an intelligible function in relation to human society 
or human flourishing’ (Hurley 1989, 113). These determinations on eligibility will be 
constrained by specifically and recognisably ethical considerations. Hurley maintains that 
specific and recognisably ethical considerations, such as considerations of courage or 
fairness, contribute to the interpreter’s ability to distinguish between eligible and ineligible 
preferences. Such ethical considerations play a constitutive role in interpretation.  
Hurley’s claim then is that in order to recognise a speaker as having rationally structured 
desires or preferences—and therefore in order to recognise them as a speaker at all— the 
interpreter must share with them some set basic ethical nature which make those desires 
and preferences explicable. This is an argument from interpretation of the form that we 
would associate with Davidson: it is claimed that it is an a priori matter, not up to us, that 
mental states are thus constrained, as without the constraints determinate content would 
not be possible at all.   
3. Problems facing the Argument from Interpretation: 
Hurley’s account51 has come under attack, notably by Bernard Williams in his essay ‘Saint-
Just’s Illusion’ (Williams 1995). In this paper Williams expresses his scepticism of the thought 
that we could get from an argument from interpretation (of the sort that Hurley provides) to 
the conclusion that all speakers must ‘share the same materials of an ethical life’ (Williams 
1995, 141). The extent to which this scepticism is valid will depend on what exactly Williams 
                                                 
50 Hurley says more about the nature of causal explanation and rational explanation at Hurley 1989, 
97. What she says here is much in line with Davidson’s own remarks. 
51 Williams is reluctant to attribute Hurley’s thesis, as he sets it out, to Davidson. I think that Davidson 
must agree with Hurley that the attribution of preferences to a speaker is inextricable from the 
attribution of some substantial values, and for reasons along the lines of those provided by Hurley. It 
is less clear that Davidson would agree with Hurley on what might follow from this. 
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means by the same materials of an ethical life. Primarily, Williams seems to be concerned 
with the question of how constraints on interpretation can guide the interpreter’s attempts 
to make sense of the speaker’s ethical nature, by which he means ‘ what they think 
important, laudable, hateful, to be condemned or despised and so forth in the actions and 
reactions of human beings’ (Williams 1995, 139). 
He takes Hurley’s position to be roughly as follows. The interpreter may find considerable 
differences between the speaker’s values and his own. Thus a speaker from one culture may 
esteem certain qualities more than we do and certain others less. Williams suggests, for 
example, that we should not be surprised if there is a special emphasis put on certain kinds 
of courage or certain forms of solidarity among speakers in a culture where people have to 
hunt for their food (Williams 1995, 141).  
The interpreter may even be able to understand that the speaker has values which are not 
candidates for serious consideration given his own (the interpreter’s) contingent historical 
circumstances. However, underneath any local variations (such as different rankings of 
preferences perhaps) there is a common human ethical sensibility of a fairly structured kind 
(at a deeper level there are no really alien values). Local variations are thus to be understood 
as surface adaptations of a shared ethical nature. Crucially, according to Hurley, this much is 
supposed to follow ‘from its being an argument from interpretation – this must be so, 
because it represents a condition of understanding these people’s lives as human at all’ 
(Williams 1995, 141). 
Williams thinks that Hurley, or anyone else working from an a priori argument from 
interpretation, will be poorly placed to make such a claim. He is happy to acknowledge that 
in interpreting other people ‘we have to take it that they and we have a good amount in 
common’. He accepts that we can take the Davidsonian point that for an interpreter to 
interpret the speech or actions of any thinker, he must suppose that their beliefs and desires 
can be incorporated in a pattern that is in essential respects like the pattern of his own 
beliefs and desires. Further, Williams acknowledges that it may well be that some of what 
they have in common might be, if in a schematic form, some ethical values. He gives the 
example of a concern with justice in some highly indeterminate form (Williams 1995, 138). 
However Williams argues that while an interpreter must assume a certain amount in 
common between himself and the speaker when he is trying to make sense of the speaker, it 
does not follow that part of what we must assume in common is in any substantial or 
determinate sense an ethical life, or, to repeat the phrase Williams uses, the shared 
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materials of an ethical life. He allows of course that any interpreter must use his own ethical 
concepts and reason giving concepts, such as they are, in the interpretation of others52. But 
Williams is sceptical about the thought that an argument from interpretation could show 
that all speakers must share some specific and substantial set of ethical concerns, concepts 
or attitudes (this is essentially what I take Williams to mean by the ‘materials of an ethical 
life’). His point is that this is what is required for Hurley’s thesis to be able to provide 
substantial conclusions in ethics, specifically regarding issues of objectivity. 
As Williams puts it, while ‘to see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the merest 
decency’, it does not tell us anything substantial about the extent of our shared ethical lives. 
Quoting Clifford Geertz, he suggests that the problem that the interpreter faces is to deploy 
his own concepts, some of which are nearer to the speaker’s and some further away ‘so as 
to produce an interpretation of the way a people lives which is neither imprisoned within 
their mental horizons, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a witch, nor systematically 
deaf to the distinctive tonalities of their existence, an ethnography of witchcraft written by a 
geometer’. Williams goes on: ‘One must bring with one beliefs, models, patterns of 
explanation (and concepts): it is they that will determine, in the end, how much identity 
there will be, and at what levels’ (Williams 1995, p143). That two speakers can talk to each 
other, and talk to each other about ethical judgements, does not show that they share, in an 
important sense, the same materials of an ethical life. The point is not that different ethical 
languages are mutually unintelligible. The interpreter can to some extent come to 
understand what the speaker, in the sense that they can assign meanings to their sentences 
and come to predict their behaviour. The point is that this level of Intelligibility does not 
guarantee homogeneity of ethical concepts, which Williams thinks is a requirement for 
ethical objectivity.  
Williams is clearly sceptical of the idea that any a priori argument from interpretation, such 
as Davidson’s or Hurley’s, could lead to substantial conclusions about a shared ethical 
nature. The key word here seems to be ‘substantial’. This scepticism, regarding the limits of 
what philosophy can tell us about ethics, runs deep in Williams’s work. 
                                                 
52 When David Lewis says that the speaker should be represented as believing what he ought to 
believe and desiring what he ought to desire, he goes on: ‘And what is that? In our opinion, he ought 
to believe what we believe and desire, or perhaps what we would have believed and desired in his 
place. (But that is only your opinion! Yes. Better we should go by an opinion we don’t hold?)’ (Hurley 
1989, 24). This is surely right but also surely obvious. 
75 | P a g e  
 
In various places he has pointed out that questions regarding the nature and extent of our 
shared ethical makeup have remained largely unanswered and recur in various other 
disciplines, such as cultural anthropology, comparative linguistics, and cognitive psychology. 
He has also remarked that the fact that these questions remain, and in such recalcitrant and 
dispersed forms, discourages him from even allowing for the possibility that they might 
suddenly be answered by an a priori philosophical argument. His specific response to 
Hurley’s argument is telling in this respect. He says: ‘It is not so much that I do not believe it 
to be true. It is rather that I cannot believe that it has to be true, that reflection on the 
demands of interpretation should be able to lead to so substantive a conclusion’ (Williams 
1995, 141).  
There is however something more specific about Williams’s scepticism than these remarks 
suggest, something that raises specific problems for the type of argument that Hurley is 
trying to develop. As I have just mentioned, Williams thinks that Hurley, or anyone else for 
that matter who is working from an a priori argument from interpretation, will be poorly 
placed to make substantial claims about the ethical lives of thinkers as such. This seems to 
be at least in part because he thinks that our best understanding of our ethical lives must 
essentially involve the consideration of other factors, such as cultural or historical 
circumstances. 
Williams is sceptical of the claim, which he seems to attribute to Hurley or at least take as 
implied by her argument, that anything an interpreter can recognise as an ethical concern 
‘must be capable of being mapped onto a structure in which it will intelligibly be related in 
ethical terms’ to ethical concerns that the interpreter himself accepts, as an ‘application, 
extension, limitation, or so forth’ (Williams 1995, 210).53 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, Williams is often concerned to emphasise the extent to 
which an ethical life, and ethical thinking, is in part essentially local; the extent to which 
many of the characteristic concepts of an ethical life may not be fully intelligible 
independently of particular social or cultural perspectives. Now it seems undeniable, and is 
indeed much commented on, that the speaker and the interpreter can inhabit, in one sense, 
very different social and cultural worlds, and that there may be many other different social 
and cultural worlds. These different social and cultural worlds can include and prioritise very 
different broadly ethical concepts and attitudes, different ethical interests and priorities. The 
                                                 
53 This is one way of understanding Hurley’s claim that by ‘constraining scepticism to operate within 
the conceptual scheme we have, we achieve a kind of objectivism’ (Hurley 1989, 57). 
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claim I am putting forward, and that I think finds expression in Williams’s work, is that there 
is a substantial sense in which speakers who inhabit different social and cultural worlds may 
be said to have very different ethical lives. 
That this is so is important because the different concepts and interests which can shape an 
ethical life will validate different reason giving explanations and rationalisations for action. In 
any given situation, the practical judgments which follow from the application of the specific 
set of ethical concepts used in one culture may not be the same as the practical judgements 
that follow from the application of the specific ethical concepts used in another culture. The 
different and differently recognised reason giving and action guiding consequences of 
certain concepts make this so. And, wherever different speakers use concepts that have 
incompatible reason giving or action guiding consequences, the question must arise about 
which of the two concepts, if any, they are to be practically guided by.  
I have suggested that this type of question, the type of question that can occur between 
those who do use a certain ethical concept and those who don’t, is particularly important in 
an ethical context. What we say about this type of disagreement is important because, as 
Williams has pointed out, one of the things that people want when they talk about 
objectivity in ethics is for there to be ‘one canonical, homogeneous ethical language. They 
want it to be conceptually homogeneous across cultures, and across disagreements within 
our culture’ (Williams, 1995a, 240). I have also suggested that an a priori argument that 
takes the consideration of radical interpretation as its starting point will be peculiarly 
impotent when it comes to addressing this type of question. That is in part because in order 
to address such questions it appears that we would need to know significantly more about 
which ethical concerns must be shared, rather than simply that some ethical concerns must 
be shared. 
Further, as was suggested in Chapter 3, a concern with some specific ethical concepts at 
least appear to require a specific kind of upbringing. If some ethical concepts require 
different kinds of upbringing, and these concepts are legitimately regarded as forming part 
of ‘an ethical life’, then we have an explanation of why we might lack the relevant 
conceptual homogeneity that Williams thinks is required for objectivity in ethics. 
Of course, Hurley does not deny that there can be substantial differences between the 
ethical concerns of different speakers. On this point it is very important not to misinterpret 
the issue between Hurley and Williams. Though her thesis is that interpretation results in a 
certain form of ethical objectivity, Hurley emphasises repeatedly throughout her book that 
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her position is compatible with, and indeed facilitates, a wide pluralism in ethics. While the 
exact nature of this pluralism is difficult to define, she certainly does not think that her 
position could show us a way to decide, in those cases where a decision is called for, what 
the right decision is or what we ought to do – she is not attempting to provide an ethical 
theory that could be axiomatised or presented in a deductive form.54 Hurley sums up her 
position here in the following way: ‘I have emphasised that the evaluative constraints on 
eligibility do not impose controversial solutions to ethical problems when fundamental 
values conflict, but rather provide a way of determining what the alternatives and hence 
issues are to begin with’ (Hurley 1989, 125).55 
The issue between Hurley and Williams hinges on whether or not she has achieved this, and 
what might follow from it if she has. According to Williams, when we ask what it is that 
underlies the variety of human ethical practice, the truth is that ‘we simply don’t have a very 
good idea what an answer could look like’, though he is willing to claim that we shouldn’t 
expect too much from any answer we might have. He remarks in one place, with typical 
dryness, that our common ethical nature seems unhelpfully to underdetermine ethical 
matters just to the extent that leaves open all the disagreement that it was hoped it would 
revolve. It is trivial that all human beings share a nature to some degree. The question we 
are considering is whether or not they share an ethical nature, and what can be shown to 
follow from the fact that they do. 
In order for an account of our shared ethical nature to tell us something more substantial, 
that is something that will enable us to address issues about ethical properties and ethical 
objectivity, it needs to be a lot clearer what our shared ethical nature might look like. One 
obvious way around this problem would be to identify some determinate set of ethical 
concepts or properties as central, that a human being must be concerned with in order to be 
regarded as a human being. Anything that lacks concern with these ethical properties would 
then not be a human being, therefore anything that is properly interpreted as a human is 
concerned with these ethical properties.  
                                                 
54 This should not be surprising. As David Wiggins has remarked, ‘even philosophers of objectivist 
formation have constantly stressed…the absence of unique solutions and unique determinations of 
the practical that naïve cognitivism (or realism) would have predicted’ (Wiggins 1998, 127). 
55 In a similar vein, John McDowell has said: ‘Where hard cases occur, the agreement that constitutes 
the background against which we can see what happens as e.g. disputes about genuine questions, 
cannot be agreement in the application of the concepts themselves. What matters is agreement 
about what counts as reasonable argument: consider how lawyers recognise competence in their 
fellows, in spite of disagreement over hard cases.’  
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Once we do this however, we are faced with an issue which was raised in Chapter 1. The 
issue was presented as follows. The radical interpreter is a cognitive imperialist of sorts, who 
imports his own categories and concepts, beliefs and principles, and applies them to the 
utterances and behaviour of the speaker. This however seems to neglect the possibility that 
he may encounter a speaker who has categories and concepts, beliefs and principles that are 
somehow radically different from his own. 
The trouble with this is that once we identify some determinate set of ethical concepts that 
is sufficiently substantial to allow us to make progress on ethical questions, we seem to 
leave ourselves open to the accusation that contingent psychological or anthropological 
assumptions (that is, constraints that pertain only to minds of a particular class) are being 
smuggled in amongst what are being passed off as necessary constraints on mindedness as 
such. Anything that Hurley suggests here would have to be sufficiently general so as to avoid 
these accusations, whilst also being sufficiently substantial so as to be informative. To say 
simply that successful interpretation makes meaningful disagreement on ethical matters 
possible, and that this depends on some foundation of agreement, is to say almost nothing. 
It seems in fact that any attempt to derive substantial ethical conclusions from an argument 
from interpretation can take two forms, each of which faces a substantial difficulty. The first 
approach would not identify any particular set of ethical concepts or properties concern 
with which is required for a successful interpretation, but rather will state that there simply 
needs to be enough material to make the identification—without a specification of what 
that material will necessarily be. I have suggested that this is somewhat unsatisfying, and 
seems to leave open a whole host of questions regarding the objectivity of ethical 
judgments.  
In order to avoid this problem there is another approach. This approach would be to identify 
some determinate set of ethical properties as central, that a human being must be 
concerned with in order to be regarded as a human being. Anything that lacks concern with 
these ethical properties would not be a human being, therefore anything that is properly 
interpreted as a human is concerned with these ethical properties.  This approach runs into 
the sort of difficulties that were raised in Chapter 1 with regards to the smuggling in of 
contingent ethical concerns, casting doubt on the objectivity of the conclusions reached.   
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Conclusions: 
The broad aim of this work was to outline, assess and elaborate on Davidson’s work on 
radical interpretation and its connections to his understanding of values, and particularly on 
his understanding of the nature of ethical judgments and concepts. The central idea that I 
consider is that the principle of charity must play much the same role in the attribution of 
values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken to show that certain 
general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which Davidson thinks follow 
from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to values as well as beliefs.  
I have suggested that there is prima facie plausibility to the idea that the role of the principle 
of charity in the attribution of values to a speaker will be similar to the role of the principle 
of charity in the attribution of beliefs to the speaker. However I argued there are important 
limitations to Davidson’s approach as it is set out, particularly with regards to certain claims 
that he wants to make about ethical judgements. It is by no means clear that we can get 
from Davidson’s account of radical interpretation to the substantial ethical claims that 
Davidson wants to make – specifically that ethical judgments must be objectively true or 
false, and that many indeed must be true.  
One criticism that I have made of Davidson is that he has not set out the nature and extent 
of his ethical claims in general in enough detail for us to be sure of their full implications. A 
substantial elaboration of Davidson’s general approach can be found in the work of Susan 
Hurley. Hurley argues more specifically that any attribution by an interpreter of desires and 
preferences to a speaker is inextricable from the attribution of some ethical values. I have 
argued that the consideration of the type of problems that Hurley’s account faces suggests 
that any attempt to derive substantial ethical conclusions from an argument from 
interpretation can take one of two forms, each of which faces a substantial difficulty.  
The first approach would not identify any particular set of ethical concepts or properties 
concern with which is required for a successful interpretation, but rather will state that 
there simply needs to be enough material to make the identification—without a 
specification of what that material will necessarily be. I have suggested that this is somewhat 
unsatisfying, and seems to leave open a whole host of questions regarding the objectivity of 
ethical judgments.  
In order to avoid this problem there is another approach. This approach would be to identify 
some determinate set of ethical properties as central, that a human being must be 
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concerned with in order to be regarded as a human being. Anything that lacks concern with 
these ethical properties would not be a human being, therefore anything that is properly 
interpreted as a human is concerned with these ethical properties. This approach however 
runs into difficulties with regards to the objection that contingent ethical concerns are being 
included amongst constraints on minds as such, casting doubt on the objectivity of the 
conclusions reached.   
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